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The first fifteen years of the new millennium have 
witnessed an increased enthusiasm for, and a stronger 
level of commitment to, Latin@ philosophy broadly 
construed. Recent work in Latin American philosophy dares 
to go beyond questions into its own possibility (which has, 
from the start, always been a guiding preoccupation for its 
practitioners), delving into the intricacies of its arguments, 
the nature of its contributions to the history of Western 
philosophy, and the usefulness of its insights to twenty-
first-century Latin@s. The opening of the field has also 
motivated questions into Latin@ philosophy itself, its nature 
and possibility, as well as the formation of philosophical 
communities dedicated to its dissemination and advocacy. 
For instance, the present issue of the newsletter announces 
the formation of the Society for Mexican-American 
Philosophy, which aims to philosophically consider topics 
relevant to the peculiarities of the Mexican-American 
experience. The Caribbean Philosophical Association 
also makes an appearance in this issue, advocating for a 
humanitarian cause that should matter to us all.
The present issue of the newsletter thus includes the 
announcement of the new society, as well as a statement 
from one already actively working for the betterment of the 
Latin@ condition. This is followed by a detailed report and 
analysis on a conference on Latin American Philosophy held 
at the University of San Francisco, organized by Manuel 
Vargas and headlined by Jorge Gracia.
Papers included in the newsletter represent the various 
ways in which scholars are pushing the boundaries of 
Latin American/Latin@ philosophy: Grant Silva’s “Why the 
Struggle Against Coloniality Is Paramount to Latin American 
Philosophy” touches upon the driving motivations of the 
discipline, while Elizabeth Millán’s “Philosophy Born of 
Colonial Struggle: One Theme, or the Whole Story of the 
Latin American Philosophical Tradition?” responds to Silva’s 
analysis; José Mendoza argues for just immigration reform 
in “Doing Away with Juan Crow: Two Standards for Just 
Immigration Reform,” while Andrew Soto appeals to critical 
race theory to consider the underpinnings of a Mexican-
American identity in “White Supremacy, Guera/o-ness, 
and Colonization: An Argument for a Mexican-American 
Philosophy.” Finally, we close with Kim Díaz’s translation 
of Guillermo Hurtado’s homage to Luis Villoro, “Portraits of 
Luis Villoro,” on the eve of the great Mexican philosopher’s 
passing in 2014.
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
The APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 
is accepting contributions for the spring 2016 issue. Our 
readers are encouraged to submit original work on any topic 
related to Hispanic/Latino thought, broadly construed. We 
publish original, scholarly treatments, as well as reflections, 
book reviews, and interviews.
Please prepare articles for anonymous review. All 
submissions should be accompanied by a short 
biographical summary of the author. Electronic submissions 
are preferred. All submissions should be limited to 5,000 
words (twenty double-spaced pages) and must follow 
the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and The 
Chicago Manual of Style formatting.
All articles submitted to the newsletter undergo anonymous 
review by members of the Committee on Hispanics.
BOOK REVIEWS
Book reviews in any area of Hispanic/Latino philosophy, 
broadly construed, are welcome. Submissions should 
be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the 
author. Book reviews may be short (500 words) or long 
(1,500 words). Electronic submissions are preferred.
DEADLINES
Deadline for spring issue is November 15. Authors should 
expect a decision by January 15. Deadline for the fall issue 
is April 15. Authors should expect a decision by June 15.
Please send all articles, book reviews, queries, comments, 
or suggestions electronically to the editor, Carlos Alberto 
Sánchez, at carlos.sanchez@sjsu.edu, or by post:
Department of Philosophy 
San Jose State University 
One Washington Sq. 
San Jose, CA 95192-0096
FORMATTING GUIDELINES
The APA Newsletters adhere to The Chicago Manual of Style. 
Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page 
numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added 
later. Use tabs instead of multiple spaces for indenting. 
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intersecting histories of white supremacy, capitalist 
exploitation, and patriarchy that undergird the 
Dominican state; the U.S. and Haitian governments, 
Haitian and Dominican elites, and multinational 
corporations have invested in market relations that 
create, rely on, and then dispose of vulnerable 
Haitian and Dominican workers.
As a transdisciplinary organization that seeks 
critically to engage and build on Africana, Latin 
American, and Indigenous philosophies of the 
Caribbean, we challenge the Dominican state’s 
reliance on an outmoded conception of state 
sovereignty that facilitates oppression and 
exploitation along axes of race, color, class, and 
gender. We stand with all those who have already 
strongly condemned the ruling and passage of the 
law (including several Caribbean governments, 
the United Nations, civil society organizations, 
regional and international social justice activists, 
and the Caribbean Studies Association) and with 
the Dominican organizations and individuals who 
have been working for decades for meaningful 
immigrant, migrant, and citizenship rights and call 
on the international community, and Caribbean 
activists, intellectuals, artists, and organizations to 
work directly with them in opposing violations in 
the Dominican Republic.
http://www.caribphil.org
ARTICLES
Report on the 2015 Fleishhacker Chair 
Lecture Series and Latin American 
Philosophy Conference
Julio Covarrubias
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON 
INTRODUCTION
What follows is a report on the Fleishhacker Chair Lecture 
Series on Latin American Philosophy, a conference hosted 
at the University of San Francisco, April 16–18, 2015. My 
aims are, first, to give a sense of the arguments found in 
the papers delivered, and second, to offer some reflections 
on themes which emerged from our discussions, and which 
I think merit further consideration. These are the themes 
of the marginalization of Latin American and Latino/a 
philosophy, and of the potential intellectual and moral 
obligations which issue from the same. I provide, then, 
in the order in which they occurred, a brief summary of 
each presentation, turning thereafter to consider the two 
themes in question. While much can be said about each 
of the papers in relation to these themes, though, I limit 
myself to speaking on just the two papers which provoked 
the thoughts I would here like to voice, namely, the papers 
presented by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Grant Silva.
Use italics instead of underlining. Use an “em dash” (—) 
instead of a double hyphen (--).
Use endnotes instead of footnotes. Examples of proper 
endnote style:
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 90.
See Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? 
(What) Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (2000): 31–55.
ANNOUNCEMENTS
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW SOCIETY FOR 
MEXICAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
The Society for Mexican-American Philosophy is dedicated 
to the support and promotion of Mexican-American 
philosophy in all of its diverse manifestations. It seeks to 
provide a venue for inquiry into philosophical issues that 
are of particular concern for Mexican-Americans and, more 
broadly, persons of Latin American descent. To this end, the 
society is particularly interested in social justice issues (e.g., 
imperialism, colonization, immigration, civil and human 
rights, race, gender, discrimination, and language) as well 
as issues pertaining to identity and citizenship in its various 
forms (e.g., social, political, or cultural). This society also 
supports historical and contemporary research on Mexican 
philosophy, including the philosophies of Mexico’s 
indigenous peoples and current work on indigeneity.
For information about upcoming sessions or meetings, 
contact, on the West Coast, Alejandro Santana (University 
of Portland) santana@up.edu; on the East Coast, José 
Jorge Mendoza (University of Massachusetts Lowell) 
Jose_Mendoza@uml.edu; or, in the Mid-West, Grant Silva 
(Marquette University) grant.silva@marquette.edu.
CPA DENUNCIATION OF RECENT DOMINICAN 
RULINGS
The following is the Caribbean Philosophical Association’s 
denunciation of the Dominican government’s recent 
retroactive stripping of the citizenship rights of Dominicans 
of Haitian descent:
We oppose the Dominican government’s and its 
defenders’ recourse to the most reactionary forms 
of state sovereignty as an answer to international 
criticism and intervention. These rulings not 
only retroactively strip the citizenship rights of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent dating as far back 
as 1929, they violate international conventions, 
setting a dangerous precedent for the treatment 
of migrant workers globally. This is yet another 
instance of the Dominican government’s failure 
to acknowledge its own hand in creating the 
vulnerable population that it now wishes to 
regularize or expel. To be sure, the Dominican 
government is not singularly responsible for the 
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receive universal protections against excessive force, and 
there should be oversight on procedures required by both 
EBS and EPS. 
2. LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AND 
COLONIALITY
Leaving the immigration issue to the side, I turn now to 
Grant Silva’s presentation, “Latin American Philosophy 
as ‘Philosophy Born of (Colonial) Struggle.’” In his paper, 
Silva claims that what distinguishes Latin American and 
Latino/a philosophy (henceforth, LALo/a philosophy) is, 
firstly, a concern (implicit or explicit) with coloniality, which 
he glosses as “the implicit power dynamics in colonial and 
post-colonial societies”; secondly, a concern with liberation 
from coloniality—that is, LALo/a philosophy is philosophy 
in the service of the liberation of those oppressed by the 
system of coloniality.1 In so arguing, Silva is in agreement 
with the philosopher of liberation, Ignacio Ellacuría, that, 
despite pretensions to the contrary, philosophical practice 
is always guided or informed by practical concerns, and 
cannot therefore be reduced to anything like the notion 
of “the search for truth for its own sake.” Latin American 
philosophy is, he insists, “an inherently politicized 
intellectual practice.” But I take it that it is no different from 
philosophy in other traditions, save for its specific concerns 
with coloniality. 
Now Silva’s explicit target in this paper is actually Jorge J. 
E. Gracia—specifically the latter’s views (or lack thereof) on 
the issue of coloniality. However, I here want to focus on 
what seem to be Silva’s implicit targets. For clarity, I divide 
them into two groups, as follows: 
(Group 1) (a) those philosophers of Latino/a 
descent who do not work on issues in LALo/a 
philosophy (defined relative to the concern with 
coloniality); and (b) who may even explicitly 
disavow LALo/a philosophy as a credible subfield;
and
(Group 2): those philosophers, whether or not 
they are of Latino/a descent, who claim to work 
on LALo/a philosophy just to advance their careers 
(for instance, in order to get a job interview), but 
do not, in fact, work in the area.2
Relative to Group 1, Silva argues that those philosophers 
who claim to work in LALo/a philosophy but yet say nothing 
about coloniality still do implicitly, by that very omission, 
display what they think or feel about it. I take it that what 
Silva here suggests is that those LALo/a thinkers belonging 
to Group 1a either (mistakenly) do not see coloniality as a 
real issue, or they willfully (and wrongly) fail to acknowledge 
that it is a real issue. But defining LALo/a philosophy as 
concerned explicitly with coloniality enables Silva to argue 
that failures to address coloniality are like failures to do 
LALo/a properly. It is, on my reading of Silva, to do LALo/a 
philosophy badly (i.e., in the wrong way, leaving open that 
it could still be “good philosophy” in some more general 
sense of abiding by disciplinary norms). 
1. IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL TRUST
To begin, the first presentation was José Jorge Mendoza’s 
“Latino/a Immigration: A Refutation of the Social Trust 
Argument.” In his paper, Mendoza takes on enforcement-
first policies by means of what he calls the social trust 
argument. Now as I understand it, an “enforcement-first” 
stance on immigration policy is the position that the 
immigration laws currently on the books ought to be now 
enforced, even while no comprehensive resolution to the 
“immigration problem” has been reached. In real terms, 
then, what this position implies is that undocumented 
migrants in the United States should be now deported, 
that the border wall ought to be now reinforced, and that 
these things should be done before the migrants currently 
present in the United States are able to obtain or be granted 
a legal status—and certainly before more undocumented 
migrants enter.
By “social trust,” on the other hand, it is meant something 
like those bonds that hold together and facilitate the 
cooperative functions necessary for societies to exist, 
and which (I take it) make democratic societies, in 
particular, possible. The social trust argument, in turn, goes 
something like this: A political community cannot survive 
without “social trust.” Furthermore, a necessary condition 
for social trust is that the political community in question 
must have discretionary control over its borders and over 
who is allowed to enter, implying that enforcement-first 
policies are permissible. Therefore, enforcement-first 
policies are permissible insofar as they secure social trust. 
Such a position is often invoked, at least in popular media, 
as a rhetorical device which relies on the force of concept 
of illegality, and its association with moral wrongness. 
Hence, disguised racial animus against migrants comes to 
be justified by such slogans as “Illegal is illegal.”
Now, an implicit claim in the foregoing argument is 
that unchecked immigration undermines social trust. 
Guided by the principle that policies should reflect the 
real sociohistorical circumstances of the United States, 
Mendoza’s strategy against enforcement-first policies is 
to accept the social trust-style argument, but to dispute 
the claim that immigration actually undermines social 
trust. In fact, he claims, enforcement-first policies actually 
undermine social trust by creating pernicious associations 
between undocumented status and “Mexican” appearance, 
turning Mexican-Americans into second-class citizens. If 
a political community wants to limit migration across its 
borders, and the rationale for doing so is securing social 
trust, therefore, it cannot do it by enforcement-first policies. 
As Mendoza notes, this argument doesn’t quite get us 
migrant rights yet, but it does get us an anti-racial profiling 
stance. The stance he envisions is comprised of two 
standards. These are the Equality of Burdens Standard (EBS), 
and the Equal Protections Standard (EPS). According to EBS, 
the burdens of immigration policies should be equally 
shared among citizens. Thus, for instance, if people with 
a “Mexican appearance” are subject to I.C.E. raids, then 
upper-class whites should be equally subject to the same. 
To off-set any further unequal treatment which may result in 
the carrying out of the requirements of the EBS, Mendoza 
suggests the EPS. According to the latter, citizens should 
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United States: Past, Present, and Future.” What Gracia 
offers in his keynote is, first of all, to sketch the history of 
the study (or lack thereof) of Latin American philosophy 
in the United States. Second, he identifies several distinct 
challenges and threats that Latin American and/or Latino/a 
philosophy (LALo/a philosophy) faces in receiving uptake 
to become established in the philosophical canon. Using 
publication data on LALo/a philosophy as an indicator of 
interest in the area, Gracia finds that—excepting few and 
far in between cases—there was virtually no interest in 
LALo/a philosophy until the 1980s. Even today, he points 
out, the subfield remains peripheral, lacking recognition in 
the mainstream. The top journals of the profession will not 
even touch LALo/a philosophy. And for that reason LALo/a 
philosophers have even had to create their own alternative 
venues (such as this newsletter). On the other hand, LALo/a 
philosophy looks like it’s here to stay, given recent trends in 
research output, and tenure-track appointments of LALo/a 
philosophy practitioners. 
In short, Gracia paints a stark, though not entirely hopeless, 
picture. I will not here recount Gracia’s findings or detail 
all of the challenges. But by way of conclusion, I mention 
only some challenges which stood out to me. First, Gracia 
claims that a challenge which we must reckon with is that 
historically many LALo/a philosophers in the United States 
were and continue to be dabblers who do not carry out 
sustained research on LALo/a philosophy. Gracia dubs 
these dabblers “dilettantes.” Granted that this is often 
a result of externally imposed constraints, he thinks this 
dilettantism must nevertheless be replaced by sustained 
research. Second, warning against the dangers of academic 
ghettoization, Gracia also suggests looking to other formerly 
marginalized subfields, such as feminist philosophy and the 
philosophy of race, which have become integrated into the 
mainstream, for models. We learn from their experience, he 
thinks, that we need to get LALo/a philosophers positions in 
major departments. Finally, he makes note of the urgency 
of undertaking translation projects, so that Latin American 
philosophy can actually be taught.
5. PLAN FOR WHAT REMAINS
Having thus provided summaries for each presentation, 
I would like now, in what remains of this report, to turn 
my focus to those themes mentioned at the outset, of 
the marginalization of LALo/a philosophy, and of the 
intellectual and moral obligations which issue from the 
same. I here limit myself to discussing these themes as 
they bear on Gracia’s and Silva’s presentations, given that 
these provoked the thoughts which I would here like to 
voice. I start, then, with commentary on Gracia and move 
on to Silva, thereafter concluding the report.
6. ON THE MARGINALIZATION OF LATIN 
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
Begin, then, with Gracia. After his keynote, I found 
myself recalling that it wasn’t only in philosophy that the 
study of Latin America, and the study of Latin American 
intellectual activity specifically, seemed marginal. It is 
a well-documented fact that the study of Latin America 
is marginalized in other disciplines, even if it might be 
thriving as an “area study” generally. For instance, in a 
For the case of Group 2, there is a concern especially 
that, given how desperate the job market has become, 
some philosophers may be claiming to work on LALo/a 
philosophy just to get interviews for jobs, despite having 
no intention to contribute to this area of study. Using the 
same style of reasoning as the above, however, Silva 
makes a case against such philosophers. If you claim to 
be a LALo/a philosopher but aren’t putting in work, the 
reasoning goes, then aside from simply having something 
like bad faith, say, you are also in some sense failing 
morally the tradition to which you are claiming to belong. 
You do not, properly speaking, belong to the tradition, or if 
you do, you are doing it badly/wrongly. This is because, on 
Silva’s view, to do LALo/a philosophy is precisely to write 
on issues pertaining to coloniality. At the end of this report, 
I will have occasion to return to this topic and offer some 
reflections on it.
3. LUIS VILLORO AND THE PLURALIST 
NATION-STATE
We turn next to Kim Díaz’s presentation on “American 
Indigenism and Democracy: Assimilation, Pluralism, and 
Autonomy.” Her project surveys the political works of 
Luis Villoro, with special reference to the discourses on 
indigenous liberation. Villoro, says Díaz, is concerned that 
indigenous cultures in Latin America are dying off or being 
assimilated into the majority mestizo culture. Furthermore, 
he criticizes liberation discourses for adopting prevalent 
stereotypes of indigenous peoples which portray them as 
“not entirely natural slaves but not entirely human either,” 
which leads to paternalism. Mestizos, Díaz points out, think 
that the indigenous have only two options open to them: 
(a) to separate into a different society or (b) to be dragged 
into modernity. 
But, on Villoro’s view, this dilemma betrays an underlying 
reluctance to extend meaningful autonomy to indigenous 
peoples. Autonomy, for Villoro, is the freedom to form one’s 
own life plan and pursue it. And the state, as Díaz points 
out, “needs to guarantee adequate social conditions for 
the realization of people’s freedom to pursue their own life-
plan.” But Euro-Americans across the continent continue 
to control the indigenous peoples. “Liberation,” however, 
“requires that Euro-Americans relinquish this control.” 
Together, the foregoing considerations speak in favor of a 
third option, which is, namely, the formation of a pluralist 
nation-state, a state whose “only role is to coordinate 
decentralized subgroups of power.” The formation of a 
pluralist nation-state, according to Díaz, does, however, 
require a particular form of tolerance. Mere tolerance, by 
which I take it that she means tolerance as forbearance, 
or tolerance arrived at by modus vivendi, Díaz thinks, 
is insufficient for a pluralist democratic community to 
function. What we need instead is tolerance that develops 
esteem for the other. 
4. THE STATE OF LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE UNITED STATES
We have arrived now, then, to the keynote lecture, given 
by Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Latin American Philosophy in the 
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which persists to this day: Witness such titles as “Born in 
Blood and Fire,” “Democracies and Dictatorships,” “Cuba: 
Between Reform and Revolution.” Consider the panic with 
which U.S. media reports on post-Chavez Venezuela, and 
the general reception, even in the scholarly literature, of 
the recent “Left Turn” in Latin America, which resorts to 
such discrediting scare-language as “neopopulism” and 
“ethnopopulism.”11
There is also evidence of a widely held assumption, 
even among some Latin Americans, that the region has 
essentially contributed nothing intellectually to world 
history. Latin America, as Wiarda puts it, was “bypassed 
by the great revolutions associated with the making of 
the modern world.”12 These are, namely: “The Protestant 
Reformation, the rise of capitalism, the scientific revolution, 
the rise of socially more pluralistic and politically more 
democratic societies, the Industrial Revolution and its 
many-faceted ramifications.”13 All of this results in even 
Latin American philosophers dismissing LALo/a philosophy 
as “merely ideological,” “purely literary,” “unoriginal,” and 
“derivative,” and this sometimes without even trying to 
show that these claims are warranted.
Together, the foregoing factors have contributed to the 
formation of pernicious stereotypes about the region 
that obscure its rich intellectual history, resulting in the 
presumption that intellectual activity simply does not occur 
in the region, and that whatever passes for it just isn’t the 
real deal. For these reasons, I claim that the marginalization 
of LALo/a philosophy is tied not just to the marginalization 
of Latin American studies generally, but the former and the 
latter are directly tied to the international marginalization 
of the region itself. For it is the latter which has produced 
racialized stereotypes of Latin Americans and Latinos that 
disassociate them from intellectual activity, and instead 
associate them with backwardness.14 To think otherwise, 
I claim, is to regard philosophers as being exempt from 
the influence of their social-political environment, 
which is, frankly, implausible. But, if I am right about 
these considerations, then they set down a challenge 
not yet identified by Gracia with which we must reckon, 
and in regards to which no ready-made solutions seem 
forthcoming. For it seems that so long as Latin America 
itself is marginalized, so too will be the study of the region 
and its intellectual activity.
7. ON INTELLECTUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR 
LATINO/A INTELLECTUALS
The foregoing challenge touches on themes which, it 
seemed to me, went unspoken but tacitly felt in all of our 
discussions in the conference. Most notably, it seemed 
to me that there was a special connection between the 
foregoing theme and Silva’s presentation. Briefly, I wish to 
offer some thoughts connecting the two papers.
To start, it is worth pointing out something left unsaid in 
Silva’s paper. This is, namely, that Silva’s project to define 
LALo/a philosophy as philosophy born of colonial struggle 
is not just descriptive, but also prescriptive: it prescribes 
what LALo/a philosophy is and should be. Let us call this 
position prescriptivism about LALo/a philosophy.
meta-analysis on the state of research on Latin America 
in political science, John D. Martz (1990) observed an 
increased estrangement between the disciplinary study 
of political science and the area study of Latin American 
studies.3 Regarding the study of intellectual activity in 
Latin America, the historian John T. Johnson had noted in 
a 1985 report that in terms of the number of publications 
on Latin America, no subfield in history had fared as poorly 
as the history of ideas.4 One might also mention the little 
attention paid to Latin America by historians of science—to 
say nothing of philosophers of science.5
It strikes me, then, that it may be profitable to situate 
Gracia’s analysis within the context of the status of the 
study of Latin America in the academy generally. If it turned 
out that Latin American studies is generally marginalized 
across disciplines, this would seem to suggest a pattern, 
and so also a different obstacle than any identified by 
Gracia—one which is related to the study of the region 
itself.6 Shortly, I provide considerations in favor of the view 
that this is the case.
Let me start, however, with an anecdote from my years 
as an undergraduate philosophy major, one which 
encapsulates a challenge that I believe we are all acutely 
aware of, but that we rarely talk about in publication.7 
Having stated my intention to pursue LALo/a philosophy to 
a peer, I was met with the following response: “What does 
Latin America have to offer,” she asked, “besides bananas 
and dictatorships?” I was, of course, both astonished and 
puzzled by the arrogance and contempt expressed by this 
question, essentially asking that I prove—on the assumption 
to the contrary—that there is intellectual merit to be found 
somewhere south of the U.S. border, and so also asking me 
to justify why it was legitimate to study LALo/a philosophy. 
What this student associated with Latin America, in other 
words, was not intellectual activity, but political violence 
and instability, tyranny and dictatorship, and that term, 
which rightly offends anyone who knows anything about 
U.S.-Latin American relations, banana republic. “What could 
these people,” she must’ve thought, “barely civilized as 
they are, have to offer intellectually to the world?”8
This latent disrespect and contempt for Latin America is, in 
my view, a significant, if not the primary, obstacle for LALo/a 
philosophy in the United States—just as latent misogyny is 
an obstacle for feminist philosophy, and latent anti-black 
racism is for philosophy of race. In fact, I suspect that LALo/a 
philosophy is especially disadvantaged, exactly in virtue of 
the fact that it is an intellectual activity historically done by 
people with origins in a racialized geographical region that 
is precisely disassociated from intellectual activity.9
Evidence for this disassociation from intellectual activity, 
and of association with instability and backwardness, is 
ample. Writing in the 1970s, the political scientist Howard 
Wiarda had already noted a tendency to talk about Latin 
America in terms of extremes, which, in retrospect, we 
can connect to the stereotypes floating around about 
the region. He cites the emergence of “scare literature” 
with such titles as “The Eleventh Hour,” “Reform or 
Revolution,” “Evolution or Destruction.”10 This followed a 
pattern of associating Latin America with instability, one 
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of Latino/a descent and to be unconcerned with LALo/a 
philosophy, to regard the intellectual efforts of our forebears 
as unworthy of attention, or, worse, to treat them as a mere 
tool to advance our own careers, is not only disrespectful 
to the tradition itself, but perhaps even to Latin American 
and Latino peoples.
It strikes me then that, for his view, Silva must assume 
more general claims like the foregoing. But he has not 
explicitly argued for them. Moreover, these are obviously 
controversial positions, especially with respect to race and 
ethnicity.17 This is not to say, however, that they are for 
that reason mistaken. In fact, I believe that the question 
of racialized rules demands greater attention from 
philosophers of color than is currently given.
But notice that we are back to the previous theme of the 
marginalization of LALo/a philosophy. Recall my suggestion, 
in the foregoing section, that the marginalization of LALo/a 
philosophy (and of Latin American studies generally) is 
entangled with the general marginalization of the region. If 
we identify coloniality as the source of this marginalization, 
then it becomes clear that the struggle against coloniality is 
itself entangled in the marginalization of LALo/a philosophy. 
Hence, if LALo/a philosophy somehow inherently involves 
the struggle against coloniality, then for that reason the 
struggle will take place within philosophy itself. The impulse 
to hold members of Group 1 and 2 morally blameworthy, 
then, comes in virtue of the fact not just that Latin Americans 
and Latinos are marginalized politically but that LALo/a 
philosophy is itself marginalized and held in contempt. 
What seems to be the source of our moral disquiet here 
is that the philosophers in question do not show a respect 
which is properly owed to LALo/a philosophy in virtue of 
its being a philosophy born of struggle. To disrespect the 
tradition in these ways, it may be claimed—and here I do 
affirm it—is to express a principle of social organization on 
which the subjugation and marginalization of Latin America 
and its peoples is affirmed, and the value of the tradition 
denied.18
8. CONCLUSION
But now these reflections come to a close. In the foregoing, 
I have summarized all presentations given at the Latin 
American philosophy conference, and I have offered some 
thoughts regarding the themes of the marginalization of 
Latin American philosophy, and of those obligations which 
I believe seem to issue from this marginalization. In the 
course of these reflections, I provided considerations for 
thinking that the marginalization of LALo/a philosophy, and 
hence of Latino/a philosophers, is in part due to the general 
marginalization of the study of Latin America, and the 
study of the intellectual activity of the region in particular, 
both of which are, in turn, related to the international 
marginalization of the region. This, I claimed, presented 
obstacles not yet identified, namely, the prejudgments 
of everything Latin American as being backwards and 
specifically not intellectually interesting.
It is likely, I suggested, that this is directly tied to the 
international geopolitical marginalization of Latin America. 
I thus identify the causes of this marginalization with 
the dynamics of coloniality to which Silva alludes. As a 
It is from this prescriptivism that Silva wishes to conclude that 
Latino/a philosophers are obliged to put in work on LALo/a 
philosophy. It would then appear that Silva is committed to 
the claim that, in the history of LALo/a philosophy, there 
have been those who have lived up to the intellectual 
obligation to be concerned with the oppressed (think of 
figures like Enrique Dussel, Ellacuría, perhaps Las Casas), 
but that others have not lived up to this responsibility (think 
especially of figures like Mario Bunge, but perhaps Silva 
would think that more traditional villains of the canon, like 
Sarmiento, may also fail to display a proper concern for 
the oppressed). Hence, today, a Latino/a philosopher who 
works exclusively, say, on Anglo-style philosophical logic, 
or Anglo-metaphysics, is also failing in this sense.
Now I take it that Silva thinks (and rightly so, in my view) 
that the failure to do LALo/a philosophy proper, or the act 
of claiming to do it only for self-gain, is especially heinous 
or blameworthy for the case of philosophers of Latino/a 
descent. Left unexplained is why this might be the case. 
But I think that at the heart of this intuition is something 
like the position that, for the case of oppressed racial or 
ethnic groups, there are legitimate moral demands which 
can be placed by them on their own members, such that, 
by meeting them, the members in question conduct 
themselves in a way proper to members of that group. 
For instance, it might be said that I have a burden as a 
Mexican-American to care for and respect the language 
and traditions I’ve inherited from my parents; or, as Charles 
Mills has suggested for the case of black men, that they 
have a moral duty to marry black women.15
Let us call the foregoing standards of conduct racialized 
rules of conduct: rules which regulate what it takes for 
me, say, to be a proper Mexican-American, as opposed 
to a “faulty” one. We might distinguish these rules from 
racialized rules of constitution: those rules which govern 
when and under what conditions someone gets to count, 
say, as a Mexican-American, and not, for instance, as a 
Native American or a white.16
Supposing that there are such rules, an interesting question 
is whether (regardless of racial or ethnic descent) there 
are analogous obligations for members of marginalized 
intellectual traditions which fall out of the very fact that 
the members in question belong to that marginalized 
tradition. One way to reconstruct Silva’s position might 
then be this: That there are constitutive rules for playing 
the game of LALo/a philosophy, and that counting as a 
LALo/a philosopher means you become obliged by certain 
rules of conduct. To be a LALo/a philosopher is be a part of 
a tradition of thought which has been concerned with our 
various colonial legacies and the search for freedom from 
the same. Thus, my being an heir to this tradition imposes 
on me those intellectual obligations which will further this 
project.
This is a somewhat less controversial position than the one 
that there are racialized rules of an analogous kind, but it 
seems that Silva is also committed to that view. Recall that 
he seems to think it is especially heinous/blameworthy for 
philosophers of Latino/a descent to belong to either Group 
1 or 2. The reason seems to be this: to be a philosopher 
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6. This contrasts with, for instance, Manuel Vargas’s approach 
of identifying challenges to LALo/a philosophy which are 
internal to the field, or which are due to the content of LALo/a 
philosophy. See Vargas, “Real Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, and 
Metametaphilosophy: On the Plight of Latin American Philosophy,” 
CR: The New Centennial Review 7, no. 3 (2007): 51–78.
7. For instance, in Gracia’s presentation, this topic is completely 
omitted. So also in Vargas’s discussion of challenges to Latin 
American philosophy (Vargas, “Real Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, 
and Metametaphilosophy”).
8. I later recalled this episode after reading the opening words of 
Charles Mills’s (2007) paper on “White Ignorance”:
 Imagine an ignorance that resists.
 Imagine an ignorance that fights back.
 Imagine an ignorance militant, aggressive, not to be   
intimidated, 
 an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go   
quietly—not at all confined to the illiterate and 
 uneducated but propagated at the highest levels of the land, 
indeed presenting itself unblushingly as
 knowledge.
 See Charles Mills, “White Ignorance,” Race and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance, eds. Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2007), 13–38.
9. Again, Johnson noted that the subfield which fared most poorly 
in regard to Latin American history was the history of ideas (“One 
Hundred Years,” 763). He speculates as to the causes, but here 
again there is also a failure to consider or even recognize widely 
held stereotypes and prejudices, even if they are only implicitly 
held, that Latin America simply is not intellectually interesting 
(ibid., 763-64).
10. Howard Wiarda, “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political 
Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model,” 
World Politics 25, no. 2 (Jan., 1973): 206.
11. The paradigm case is perhaps Jorge Castañeda’s influential “Latin 
America’s Left Turn” in Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (May/June 2006). 
This article provoked a number of responses, such as Hector E. 
Schamis, “Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions,” 
Journal of Democracy 17, no. 4 (2006): 20–34; Kenneth Roberts, 
“Latin America’s Populist Revival,” SAIS Review 27, no. 1 (2007): 
3–15; and Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Rise of Populism and the Left 
in Latin America,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007): 81–95. 
Notably, the latter tried to argue using survey data that the shift 
to the left in Latin America meant a shift away from democracy.
12. Wiarda, “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in 
the Iberic-Latin Tradition,” 209.
13. Ibid.
14. It bears noting that the claims I have argued for here are by nature 
speculative. The kind of study required to assess the claims I 
have made would likely require cross-disciplinary expertise and 
perhaps interdisciplinary collaboration. No one I know of in our 
discipline has attempted such a project, and no one in the near 
future is likely to do so. For that reason, I proposed to offer a 
start here. Conceding that all of this may be ultimately mistaken, 
I am for my part persuaded of what I have said, and I hope to be 
persuasive enough to convince this audience (or at least to have 
stirred someone up enough to undertake the more thoroughly 
comprehensive kind of study required to assess my claims). I am 
surprised, though, that I have not encountered a publication which 
has explicitly connected the marginalization of Latin America, and 
its study, to the marginalization of LALo/a philosophy in the United 
States. For it seems to be a widely held, if unarticulated, sentiment 
among LALo/a philosophers, even among Latin Americanists 
generally. In any case, if I owe anyone credit for these thoughts, 
it is likely Michael Mitchell, with whom I studied Latin American 
politics as an undergraduate. Discussions in his seminars began 
my thinking of the marginalization of LALo/a philosophy as tied to 
the general marginalization of the region.
15. See Charles Mills, “Do Black Men Have a Moral Duty to Marry 
Black Women?” Journal of Social Philosophy 25th Anniversary 
Special Issue (1994): 131–53.
consequence, it seems that the marginalization of LALo/a 
philosophy will persist so long as Latin America itself 
remains marginal. Our struggles for intellectual recognition 
come, in this way, to be tied together to the struggles of our 
peoples for social and political recognition, connecting also 
the question of marginalization to Silva’s prescriptivism. 
Out of this fall those intellectual and moral obligations 
discussed in the foregoing. By reference to the idea of 
rules of conduct and constitution, moreover, I raised the 
questions of whether such rules exist, not just for members 
of oppressed or marginalized groups, but also for members 
of marginalized intellectual traditions. I suggested that the 
answer to both of these questions was a Yes, but these 
themes obviously merit a deeper engagement than can 
now be given.
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes are pulled directly from 
the presentations.
2. I note that it’s not without irony, respecting this latter target, that 
Silva is here essentially concerned that there are usurpers out 
there who are, so to speak, “taking our jobs!”
3. See John D. Martz, “Political Science and Latin American Studies: 
Patterns and Asymmetries of Research and Publication,” Latin 
American Research Review 25, no. 1 (Nov. 1990): 67–86. To take 
just a sampling of his findings on publication data: between 
1960 and 1987, out of the total of 1,155 articles appearing in 
the prestigious journal American Political Science Review, just 
17 of them (1.5 percent) were on Latin America; in the Journal 
of Politics, 18 of the 892 publications (2 percent); in World 
Politics, 18 of 461 (3.9 percent) (Martz, “Political Science and 
Latin American Studies,” 70). At the same time, during that 
period, there was a consistent percentage of submissions by 
political scientists (between 22 and 28 percent) to area studies 
alternatives like Latin American Research Review, indicating that 
political scientists working on the region have been engaged 
in sustained research (ibid., 75). Martz suggests there is a 
certain irony, then, given the low numbers of publications in 
the major disciplinary venues, that we should not anticipate 
to find in political science journals the major empirical and 
theoretical contributions to come on Latin American politics. 
“That commentary alone,” he concludes, “speaks eloquently 
about the relationship between Latin American area studies and 
the discipline of political science” (ibid., 83). (A further irony is 
that this paper was not actually published in a political science 
journal, and instead in a Latin American studies one.) See also 
Martz, “The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative 
Politics,” The Journal of Politics 28, no. 1 (Feb 1966): 57–80.
 I am unaware of any follow-up study on Martz’s findings, but I 
took the liberty of casually browsing the American Political Science 
Review while writing this article and counted that, to date, a total 
of about 17 articles with titles on Latin America were published in 
the past 15 years. For World Politics, I counted back five years for a 
total of three or four publications on Latin America. Obviously, my 
numbers should be confirmed before they are cited.
 Finally, it is worth pointing out that the low number of 
publications in political science journals are still numbers which 
we in philosophy can at this time only ever dream to see in the 
“top” journals in our field.
4. See John T. Johnson, “One Hundred Years of Historical Writing on 
Modern Latin America by United States Historians,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 65, no. 4 (Nov. 1985): 763.
5. My understanding is that there are not many U.S. scholars, and 
even fewer philosophers, who have given much attention to 
the history of science in Latin America. For an introduction to 
this topic, see Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and Marcos Cueto’s 
“Latin America” in An Introduction to the History of Science 
in Non-Western Traditions, eds. Douglas Allchin and Robert 
DeKisky (Seattle: History of Science Society, 1999), 49–62. 
Recently, Manuel Vargas has advocated for the study of Latin 
American history and philosophy of science in “Lessons from the 
Philosophy of Race in Mexico,” SPEP Supplement (2000): 18–29.
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in light of coloniality (not just colonization), as central to 
philosophical practice. The previous, however, are topics 
and concerns of great importance in other branches of 
philosophy and even in other disciplines. Thus, as Jorge J. E. 
Gracia explains below (in so many words), I am perhaps only 
capable of painting a picture of Latin American philosophy 
as “philosophy born of [colonial] struggle,” to slightly tweak 
the phrase coined by the African American philosopher 
Leonard Harris.4 This limitation is not a problem; I have 
no problem viewing Latin American philosophy as part of 
a larger philosophical practice committed to struggling 
against coloniality in its various manifestations. I think this 
imbues Latin American philosophy with a proclivity towards 
praxis that is missing in most of academic philosophy. In 
addition, I think there is an important difference between 
philosophizing from freedom and philosophizing for the 
sake of freedom. Philosophy looks different and often 
assumes “non-canonical,” “non-philosophical,” or “non-
traditional” purposes and problematics in political and 
socio-economic contexts plagued by ongoing structures of 
oppression, especially those resulting from coloniality.
For the most part, philosophers residing in imperial, 
developed countries are typically free (or at least free 
enough) to think without the constraints or burdens of their 
particular social, cultural, racial, and gendered existence. 
These individuals tend to think “universally” and their 
subjectivity or identity rarely enters the philosophical 
purview, except for discussions of identity writ large (in 
the sense that J. Locke talks about personal identity). This 
is especially true when the face of philosophy reflects 
the dominant racial, gender, class, and/or sexual norm, 
or when one’s status in country or place of residence is 
authorized by the state; that is, when one’s subjectivity is 
legally, metaphysically, and socio-historically secure. To 
philosophize from this perspective does not mean that 
one is totally free of conflict or strife, for nobody lives a 
life free of turmoil of some kind. Nevertheless, there exist 
ways of practicing philosophy that begin from socially 
advantageous positions that subsequently delimit the 
philosophical practice. 
For those in colonial (and even “post-colonial”) circumstances 
that find themselves on the side of underdevelopment, 
poverty, marginality, and domination, this luxury is not so 
apparent.5 For those that think for the sake of freedom the 
exigencies of their circumstances force a critical reflective 
stance that targets oppression, structural inequalities, 
pain, and suffering. Since “privileged” philosophers think 
from perspectives where their interests and problems 
are recognized and align with traditional or historical 
philosophical problematics, their status as philosophers 
is never in question. Those philosophers who begin from 
contested, dominated, and oppressed social locales are said 
to think about “non-philosophical” issues, their discourses 
remain unauthorized and non-canonical for reasons that 
reflect nothing other than bias, blatant disregard, and the 
force of history.6 These are the non-philosophers, the ones 
that use philosophy for instrumental reasons, and in so 
doing jeopardize their stance in academic and intellectual 
circles—this where I place Latin American philosophy.
16. I got the idea for this distinction in a conversation with Bernard 
Kobes, who pointed me to John Searle’s distinction between 
regulative rules and constitutive rules in Speech Acts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 33. The distinction is this: 
“regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently 
existing forms of behaviour; for example, many rules of etiquette 
regulate inter-personal relationships which exist independently 
of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they 
create or define new forms of behaviour. The rules of football or 
chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or 
chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing 
such games.”
17. Most philosophers, under the influence of liberal individualism 
perhaps, would reject this view on the grounds that there is 
not a proper way to be a Latino/a and also no proper way to be 
a Latino/a philosopher. After all, to claim that there are moral 
obligations in virtue of one’s (unchosen) race or ethnicity, they 
would say, is to essentialize the very same, which is descriptively 
mistaken insofar as races are not real, and it might be thought 
to be morally impermissible insofar as it denies the “priority 
of individual liberty,” or imposes unwanted obligations on 
individuals without their consent. I am of the mind that this line 
of argument is mistaken in regard to racialized and oppressed/
marginalized groups. Someone wanting to make the case would 
want, however, to distinguish between the in-fact rules which 
our social reality collectively sustains, some of which may be 
pernicious (e.g., Jim Crow-era rules of conduct), and those that 
would be appropriate rules for people of color to adopt in order 
to combat oppression. In a future work, I would like to expand on 
this theme, but here I set this issue aside.
18. This, of course, is not to say that we cannot criticize our 
philosophical forbears. It is just to point to the social meaning 
attached to the disavowal and dismissal of LALo/a philosophy by 
other philosophers, and particularly by Latino/a philosophers.
Why the Struggle Against Coloniality Is 
Paramount to Latin American Philosophy
Grant J. Silva
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
As a Latino philosopher who teaches and specializes in Latin 
American philosophy, I am often frustrated by explanations 
of this subfield that describe it as “philosophy, just south 
of the United States border” or “any kind of philosophy 
done in Latin America.”1 Other ways of putting this suggest 
that Latin American philosophy is an area of thought 
concerned with the history of philosophy in Latin America 
as opposed to the possibility of a distinctive Latin American 
philosophy, the former often a report on easily recognizable 
sub-disciplines—such as Marxism, phenomenology, 
philosophical anthropology, analytic philosophy, axiology, 
philosophy of law—as they have taken place in Latin 
America (including Brazil), the Caribbean, and even 
amongst Latino/as in the United States.2 Although meant to 
be inclusive (perhaps too inclusive), the above descriptions 
are vague and mislead those unfamiliar with the field. They 
eclipse a “tradition,” for lack of a better word, that takes the 
idea of Latin America and all the identity crises that come 
with this regional affiliation as the point of departure for 
philosophical analysis and practice.3
This tradition places much importance on the goal of 
liberation, the idea of freedom (an idea realized in various 
ways), the significance and unavoidability of “place” or 
one’s circumstance, and the need for creativity and/or 
“openness,” especially in terms of how one thinks and lives 
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There is much to appreciate in Gracia’s comments, 
particularly his anti-essentialism and turn to a familial-
historical model for understanding group identities 
(Gracia’s modus operandi10). Both are worthwhile 
contributions to philosophy of race and ethnicity, and, as 
I will suggest, epitomize a Latin American philosophical 
concern with freedom from totalizing concepts, the type of 
which are typified by colonial impositions. Gracia assumes 
that like ethnic groups themselves, it is wrong to think 
of “ethnic philosophies” in essentialized ways that rely 
upon necessary and sufficient conditions. There is no one 
definitive characteristic or trait that defines the members 
of an ethnic group. Instead, ethnic groups are cluster 
concepts, groupings united on their relation to a variety 
of traits to characteristics, none of which are necessary 
and often context-specific. Ethnic philosophies supervene 
on ethnic groups, and the fact that members of an ethnic 
group do not share in a single feature entails that a 
philosophy arising from this group cannot harbor universal 
characteristics. Gracia holds that “ethnic philosophies 
are historical realities enmeshed in webs of complicated 
relations.” He continues, “a proper understanding of them 
must reflect this reality [. . .] the conditions of membership 
vary, as history itself does, allowing for different groupings 
and ways of looking at them.”11
There are two dimensions of Gracia’s views that are worth 
focusing on. One pertains to the idea of history itself; 
the other to how history is interpreted. There are various 
ways of explaining what history is: (1) facts or events 
that have taken place; (2) interpretation or accounts of 
facts as performed by historians; and (3) “history” as a 
discipline, which entails an assortment of meta-historical 
and methodological principles and commitments.12 This 
variegated understanding of history results in no exclusive 
way of looking at the past or even agreement upon what 
constitutes “history.” One’s interests, goals, proximity, or 
distance to the subject in question condition how they 
view the past. To impose a single monolithic interpretation 
of the past frustrates other ways of viewing history and, 
more importantly, preempts the formulation of novel 
perspectives. For ethnic philosophies like Latin American 
philosophy, such imperial approaches to its history limit 
the range of possible interpretations (and manifestations) 
in the present and future. As I take it, Gracia’s views are not 
just about the multiplicity that is the past, but also about 
the dynamic and creative nature of the present determined 
by that “past” and the possibility for an open future. To 
say that all members of an ethnic philosophy necessarily 
share in one common feature is to totalize or master the 
practice and boundaries of that philosophy. This means 
the concepts that arise from this group will be limited by 
the conditions that are imposed by an over-determined 
historical view. This would be the colonization of a particular 
ethnic philosophy.13
My “liberationist” reading of Gracia’s work is supported 
by his views on ethnic groupings. While discussing the 
problems that arise when one expects all Latino/as to speak 
Spanish or eat beans and rice or dance salsa, namely, the 
problems with stereotypes, he writes:
While the above dichotomy admits of problems on multiple 
levels, it nonetheless presents opportunity to examine the 
difference offered by Latin American and other ways of 
doing philosophy. Whatever Latin American philosophy 
(LAP) may be, philosophy at the service of freedom plays 
a crucial role in the tradition I am concerned with, one 
that cannot be subsumed into a retelling of the history 
of Western thought as it has taken place south of the U.S. 
border. More than just the history of philosophy in the 
region, Latin American philosophy is an example of what 
philosophy looks like in the face of coloniality.7
What follows contains a weak claim and a strong claim 
(perhaps a better way of describing these is to say 
descriptive and normative). The weaker claim is that one can 
interpret or describe the works of various Latin American 
philosophers as concerned with freedom, liberty, and the 
problem of colonization or coloniality, even when this is 
not the explicit goal of the author. More often than not, no 
interpretation is needed. Whether it is national liberation 
or questions of mestizaje; epistemic or political justice 
for indigenous peoples; freedom from political, racial, 
or gender oppression imposed by a patriarchal/colonial 
order; the importance of authenticity or originality in light 
of colonialism; or even anti-essentialist understandings 
of Latino/a identity, a majority of what constitutes Latin 
American philosophy revolves around, has been impacted 
by and concerned with, coloniality and liberation. This is not 
to suggest that every page of Latin American philosophy 
contains the words “colonial,” “coloniality,” “liberation,” 
or derivatives of these terms. Nevertheless, I believe that 
one is hard pressed to find “pure” philosophical content 
in Latin America that is not in some way engendered by 
or valued for its contribution to Latin American societies 
or cultures. This imbues Latin American philosophy with 
a tendency towards political thought, such that the term 
“Latin American political philosophy” is a pleonasm at best 
and a tautology at worst.
So as to take the more difficult route, I offer Gracia’s thoughts 
on why coloniality or colonization cannot be the basis for 
LAP as an example of an implicit instance where liberation-
themes nonetheless abound. In his essay, “Ethnic Labels 
and Philosophy,” Gracia argues that what is distinctive 
about Latin American philosophy, or that which unites Latin 
American thinkers under the umbrella of “Latin American 
philosophy,” cannot be “the experience of so-called 
coloniality, or even perhaps marginality.”8 Colonization 
cannot serve as the basis for Latin American philosophy 
since not all experiences of colonialism are uniform nor is 
colonization unique to Latin American history. Coloniality 
as the basis for Latin American philosophy establishes 
conditions that are either too strict, such that it leaves 
out some of the region’s best thinkers who never wrote 
a word about colonization, or this criterion establishes 
conditions that are satisfied by many non-Latin Americans, 
e.g., Africans, Asians, and perhaps even North Americans. 
At best, Gracia continues, “even if one were to accept that 
coloniality is in fact something that characterizes Latin 
American philosophy, this would help to separate it only 
from philosophy which is a product of the First World, not 
from the philosophy of other parts of the world that have 
also suffered colonial exploitation.”9
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of America, as Gracia does, and a range of topics that 
tend to be discussed by various thinkers that fall within 
this area of study, these are historically contingent and 
always contextualized. Thus, what is called “Latin American 
philosophy” is not meaningless, as this title signifies a 
set of questions that are clumped together for a variety 
of reasons, none of which should reign supreme. Thus, to 
say that Latin American philosophy maintains an inherent 
tendency towards liberatory thought is simply to highlight 
a contingent history that makes sense in light of a desire 
to differentiate Latin American philosophy from those 
descriptions of this field posed at the onset of this essay 
(for the reasons offered above in addition to those that 
come below).
I ask, if the burden of differentiating Latin American 
philosophy from Anglophonic interpretations of the 
philosophical canon falls upon the texts and ideas that 
do not just retell the history of Western philosophy south 
of the U.S. border but represent a particular way of doing 
philosophy that is unique to “Latin America” and other parts 
of the world, why continue with such descriptions of LAP 
as those provided at the onset of this paper? How might 
those other texts, the ones that are often emphasized when 
explaining what LAP is or why this area makes worthwhile 
contributions to academic philosophy in the United States, 
be the real difference makers, so to speak? How does this 
point to that which distinguishes LAP from “mainstream” 
understandings of philosophy?
To say that colonialism ought to be a starting point for 
Latin American philosophy is where controversy starts. 
It is problematic, I admit, to think of colonization as an 
indispensable basis for Latin American philosophy (and 
note that I am aware of the totalizing nature of my claim). 
First off, as Gracia explained above, not all Latin Americans 
have suffered colonialism equally. Here, however, I think 
there is a tendency to think about the experience of 
colonization strictly from the perspective of the victim. I 
offer as example the way whiteness has been understood 
in the context of the United States for support.
It is often the case that white people report that the 
experience of race does not play a central role in their 
life. Being part of the dominant racial group, race is not an 
issue for whites the way it is for Blacks, Hispanics, Native 
Americans, or Asians. Nonetheless, is this to say that white 
identity is race-less? Is this to assume that whiteness has 
not been impacted by the existence of race? Of course not; 
the white experience of race—for the most part, since white 
people always want to remind of the fact that nonwhites 
can be racist to whites as well—is best understood as 
constituting the oppressive side of race relations. Self-
effacing white people who claim to be “white-trash” sound 
as ridiculous as me claiming to be “male-trash”; regardless 
of how much I hate it, others will assign to me the privileges 
that come with masculinity. Nevertheless, even if whites 
do not “feel” race, there is a way in which white identity 
is predicated on the existence of nonwhites. Given that 
whiteness has often been associated with rights, privileges, 
and benefits denied to others, whiteness operates more in 
antagonistic ways. While we may not be able to positively 
identify what whiteness is, we can, and historians often do, 
These examples illustrate the fact that to be Latino 
does not entail much that is generally associated 
with the stereotype. But why should this lumping 
and homogenization generate fear in the Latino 
population? Why do we find strident voices 
complaining and warning about this phenomenon? 
Because we worry that by being lumped together 
into one stereotyped group, the reality which we 
are will be misunderstood—we will be taken as 
what we are not and this can affect our lives in 
significant ways, some very nefarious to our well 
being. Homogenization becomes particularly 
dangerous in political contexts because the 
government often formulates and implements 
social policy based on stereotypes.14
Again, the problem with stereotypes is that they impose 
an image of what it means to be from a particular group 
before individuals have a chance to define themselves. 
Stereotypes limit how our reality will be understood. While 
Gracia may fall back on the claim that there is no normative 
dimension to his argument for the familial-historical view, 
meaning that he is simply painting a more accurate picture 
of reality, the moral dimensions of his train of thought are 
visible in the above passage (i.e., “nefarious to our well 
being”).
Gracia’s comments are reminiscent of what the philosopher 
of liberation, Enrique Dussel, writes while speaking about 
the victim of colonization:
Distant thinkers, those who had a perspective of 
the center from the periphery, those who had to 
define themselves in the presence of an already 
established image of the human person and in 
the presence of uncivilized fellow humans, the 
newcomers, the ones who hope because they are 
always outside, these are the ones who a have 
clear mind for pondering reality.15
“Distant thinkers” are those residing on “the outside” of 
hegemonic circles and totalizing systems; those in colonial 
peripheries in relation to a center that is Europe; those 
for whom their status as a rational subject implies spatial 
connotations, i.e., an aperture or distance from the imposing 
views of the center; those who had images of humanity’s 
past cast upon them in terms of being considered 
barbarian, pre-modern, savage, inferior. “Newcomers,” or 
those for whom creative interpretive practices are possible, 
are best suited to ponder reality since, as Dussel continues, 
they do not seek to defend any privileges or ideological 
perspective.
For Gracia, the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions 
does not rob ethnic philosophies or ethnic groups of an 
identity. Like proper names or dates of birth, there is a 
sense in which ethnic philosophies have specific points of 
origin or arise from a set of circumstances that is unique 
to that grouping (this uniqueness does not entail that the 
traits in question will not be shared by others). However, 
one cannot think of that identity as anything other than 
contingent and contextual. Although Latin American 
philosophy may have a starting point, say the “discovery” 
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cannot be creativity, an aesthetical, epistemological, 
existential, and even political category (remember what José 
Martí says in Nuestra América: “Gobernante, en un pueblo 
nuevo, quiere decir creador”).
Philosophy has always been “creative,” i.e., connected 
to freedom from oppression and striving for a kind of 
openness or responsiveness to life. As Ellacuría wrote in 
“The Liberating Function of Philosophy,”
We can say that philosophy has always had to do 
with freedom, though in different ways. It has 
been assumed that philosophy is that task of free 
individuals and free peoples, free at least of the 
basic needs that can suppress the kind of thinking 
we call philosophy. We also acknowledge that it has 
a liberating function for those who philosophize 
and that as the supreme exercise of reason, it has 
liberated people from obscurantism, ignorance, 
and falsehood. Throughout the centuries, from 
the pre-Socratics to the Enlightenment, through 
all methods of critical thinking, we have ascribed 
a great superiority to reason, and to philosophical 
reason in particular, as a result of its liberating 
function.
[. . .]
This matter of philosophy and freedom gets to the 
fundamental purpose of philosophical knowledge, 
which even if it is understood as a search for truth, 
cannot be reduced to being a search for truth for 
its own sake.21
In almost a prophetic sense, to think of Latin American 
philosophy as “philosophy born of colonial struggle” 
returns philosophy to its original purpose. Whether it 
is from ignorance, misuses of reason, political force, or 
popular dogma, a liberatory dimension has always been 
part of philosophy.
For Ellacuría, the beauty that is philosophical thought 
renders this liberatory tendency explicit when it serves as 
the mouthpiece for a community’s concerns, interests, and 
means of critical and creative self-understanding. Critical 
and creative thought necessitates engaging the full range 
of humanity, not just the elite. Philosophers may be the 
voice of the community, but they are not a revolutionary 
vanguard. Part of the philosopher’s epistemological tool 
kit is the greater portions of society (in Latin America), 
the poor, dominated, and oppressed. Philosophers fail to 
formulate complete conceptions of truth, beauty, meaning, 
and value when the oppressed, poor, and marginalized are 
ignored as sources for knowledge.
That being said, for one to grow up amidst colonial 
oppression, experience it, or perhaps even benefit by 
it, and yet not think philosophically about it takes a 
tremendous amount of effort. To not write about it means 
that one is an “ideologue,” which implies a denier life. It 
is difficult, if not impossible, to think philosophically as a 
Latin American and not be concerned with colonization or 
a derivative subtopic in some way. To not do so requires 
identify the way in which whiteness is a social, political, 
and legal construct that was used to exclude Asians, African 
Americans, and now Hispanics.16
In short, one’s experience of race, or colonization for that 
matter, does not have to begin as victim. This is pertinent 
to my goals in this essay since it sets up the stronger claim: 
Latin American philosophers ought to think of themselves 
as concerned with “philosophers for freedom.”17 I hold this 
view to such an extent that the absence of colonialism or 
liberation-themes from their work can be interpreted as 
a stance on colonization, especially when injustices and 
inequality is ubiquitous in their immediate surroundings 
(the culpability and definitiveness of silence). We can 
take the absence of explicit engagement with the idea of 
coloniality as the basis for one’s opinion on this topic: they 
do not really care about it or represent such a privileged 
approach to philosophy such that they cannot really be 
considered part of the Latin American tradition.18
This stronger claim is partially supported by Ignacio 
Ellacuría’s (the Jesuit philosopher murdered during the 
Salvadorian civil war) views on the liberating aspects of 
philosophy and his normative suggestion that philosophers 
ought to concern themselves with the socio-historical 
contexts they inhabit.19 Crucial to Ellacuría’s views on 
philosophy are both a critical and creative components.20
Since it plays a role in supporting political and socio-
economic institutions, one of the natural targets of 
philosophical critique has always been ideology. Being the 
means through which humans sustain themselves, socio-
economic and political institutions are literally shaping 
human reality by structuring and determining the lives 
and communities of those they serve. Even though it may 
be inherently neutral, ideology, an outgrowth of existing 
institutions, affixes itself to the prevailing understanding of 
reality and reinforces the status quo. In doing so, ideology 
assists in the stifling of growth, thereby denying the 
community the possibility of life. If human communities 
are composed of living beings, their interests and concerns 
cannot be captured by a single economic or political 
structure backed by an ideological outlook that justifies 
itself. That would be to say that all human problems, 
concerns, and creative outputs have reached their zenith, 
something obviously untrue if we are speaking about living 
beings. Philosophy and philosophers fail to represent 
the dynamic entity that is the community when they are 
not sufficiently critical of ideology. Philosophers are 
those individuals that ought to concern themselves with 
this stagnation of life else they deny the conditions that 
engender ensuing philosophical thought. For Ellacuría, the 
fact that Latin American cultures lack a philosophy of their 
own reflects part of the reason why the region remains in 
the grips of inequality and violence.
Yet, never is this criticizing done for no other sake besides 
questioning the status quo; an implicit goal of philosophy has 
always been to bring about change, to improve the situation 
at hand, or at the very least assist in making alternatives to 
the status quo imaginable (and thus possible). Philosophy 
does this by making clear the foundations, or lack thereof, 
of ideology. For Ellacuría, without sufficient critique, there 
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7. Coloniality is not necessarily the rule of a particular colonial 
order or regime, like that of Spain in Mexico or Peru, but is 
the power dynamic implicit to colonial systems resulting in 
stratified social hierarchies divided in terms of class, land rights, 
race, gender, political power, education, and even knowledge-
proprietor or that known. There are thus ontological, historical, 
and epistemological dimensions to coloniality. Although national 
liberation may take place, and thus a society may be “post-
colonial,” there is a sense in which the power dynamics implicit 
to colonization (i.e., coloniality) may still be operational. Aníbal 
Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 
Nepantla: Views from the South 1, no. 3 (2000).
8. Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Ethnic Labels and Philosophy,” Latin American 
Philosophy: Currents, Issues, Debates, Eduardo Mendieta, ed. 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003), 63.
9. Ibid.
10. See also Gracia, Hispanic/Latino Identity (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers Inc., 2000), 48; Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and 
Nationality (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 49–55; and Gracia, 
Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2008).
11. Gracia, “Ethnic Labels and Philosophy,” 58.
12. Ibid.
13. Compare Gracia’s thoughts on history of those of Enrique Dussel 
in his recent political philosophy and ethics. Dussel begins his 
three-volume work on political philosophy with the first volume a 
rethinking of the history of political thought. Rather than start with 
the Greeks, Dussel ventures back farther to reveal the sources for 
the Greek terms for “justice,” “demos,” “equality,” and “destiny.” 
See Enrique Dussel, Politics of Liberation: A Critical World History, 
trans. Thia Cooper (London: SCM Press: 2011 [2007]), 15-16. His 
ethics does the same. The point of comparison with Gracia is that 
where multiple ways of viewing the past lead to a variety of ways 
of thinking about the present and future. Novel justice claims or 
ethical ideas do not come from nowhere; they have a history.
14. Gracia, Latinos in America, xi-xii. Emphasis added.
15. Ibid., 4. Emphasis added.
16. See Ian Haney López, White By Law: The Legal Construction of 
Race (New York: NYU Press, 2006 [1996]).
17. At this point, some may worry that I am creating a scenario where 
I undermine the dynamic nature of Latin American philosophy. 
Risieri Frondizi articulated such a concern in his famous essay 
“Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?” Phenomenology and 
Philosophical Research Vol. IX, no. 3 (1949). As Frondizi explains, 
philosophers who attempt to think from the perspective of a 
Latin American “corrupt” (my word) the philosophical process. 
By trying to be Latin America or think as a Latin American, one 
runs the risk of self-consciously limiting the creative process 
and perhaps even obviates the possibility for an authentic LAP 
(351–53). The conscious attempt to think in Latin American ways, 
whatever that may be, is a self-imposed handicap that might 
result in the abandonment or dismissal of many ideas that fit the 
Latin American script. Much like being “cool,” one just is; trying 
to be “cool” is not cool. I do not see this as much of a problem 
as I do further proof of the importance of unbridled creativity (or 
freedom) in LAP.
18. The following comments are inspired by Charles Mills’s 
discussion of racial justice and racism in the work of John Rawls. 
See Charles Mills, “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls,” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy XLVII (2009): 161–82.
19. Ignacio Ellacuría, “The Liberating Function of Philosophy (1985),” 
in Essays on History, Liberation, and Salvation,” Michael E. Lee, 
ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013), 93–119.
20. Ellacuría, “The Liberating Function of Philosophy,” 96–107.
21. Ibid., 93–119.
conscious effort and willful ignorance, the type of which 
ought to be morally culpable. For those that worry that this 
normative standard leaves out many of Latin America’s 
best thinkers, I think there is a way in which we can keep 
those who do not write on colonialism in the LAP canon: We 
should interpret their silence on this topic as indicative of 
their stance on this issue. Namely, it is an issue not worth 
their attention. Their lack of concern or attention renders 
them complicit with the ideology that supports the status 
quo, which on the one hand stagnates the dynamism that 
is the human community. In the context of Latin America, 
to leave ideology intact is to turn one’s head to social 
and political institutions responsible for the deaths of the 
poor, oppressed, nonwhite (or insufficiently mestizo/a and 
mulatto/a) masses.
What is the nature of philosophy for those who are 
existentially compelled to philosophize? Philosophy, for 
those in this predicament, is not a choice. It is a vocation; 
the pursuit of freedom imposed by the non-freedom 
one lives; a duty brought on by a reality that denies the 
humanity of people. This is what Latin American philosophy 
as a philosophy born of colonial struggle means, and that is 
how I think about Latin American philosophy as a tradition 
that exceeds the history of philosophy south of the U.S. 
border.
NOTES
1. See the comments made by Manuel Vargas in “Multicultural 
Philosophy Panel 2: Comparative Philosophy” (https://vimeo.
com/58932466, accessed July 1, 2015).
2. For a brief discussion of the difference between these 
characterizations (one that also explains how they are compatible 
and not antagonistic), see Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and 
Otávio Bueno, “Introduction” in A Companion to Latin American 
Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 1-2. See also 
Nuccetelli, “Latin American Philosophy,” A Companion to Latin 
American Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 343–57.
3. When Latin American philosophy is understood as simply the 
history of philosophy in Latin America or “philosophy south of the 
U.S. border,” any philosopher in Latin America or with a Hispanic 
surname becomes a Latin American philosopher. I worry about 
this when it comes to job prospects for those who work in this 
area. I think this subfield requires more specialization rather than 
just inclusion for the sake of adding numbers. I thank Kim Diáz 
for reminding me of Tommy Curry’s comments in this regard. 
Perhaps all this paper calls for is more specialization.
4. See Leonard Harris (ed.), Philosophy Born of Struggle (Dubuque, 
IO: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1983). Only the historical 
specificity of the struggle against coloniality as it has taken place 
in Latin America can differentiate Latin American philosophy 
from say African, Asian, and more. I am aware that colonization 
does not happen in any uniform or monolithic way; hence, my 
desire to talk about “philosophy born of colonial struggle” in a 
general sense.
5. The qualifier that runs throughout this sentence implicitly 
acknowledges that not all who come from colonial circumstances 
represent an oppressed or victimized perspective. Thus, there 
are many from Latin American metropolises that represent elite 
points of view and philosophize from freedom. As I explore 
below, especially in my discussion of Ignacio Ellacuría’s views 
on the nature of philosophy, all academic or professional 
philosophers think from freedom. Some philosophers, however, 
are more interested in living an understanding of philosophy that 
places it at the service of various social, political, and economic 
pursuits.
6. Along these lines, see the contributions by Ofelia Schutte and 
Jorge J. E. Gracia to George Yancy’s Reframing the Practice of 
Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2012).
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make a stronger case for the view that Silva is presenting 
in his paper. Of course, once a working definition of 
“freedom” is offered, we would then need a more detailed 
defense of why we would want to describe philosophy as 
at its service. I think this way of describing Latin American 
philosophy may pose serious problems for Silva’s account, 
and ultimately become a disservice to the tradition he is 
seeking to restore. Silva is impatient with those who cannot 
accept that philosophy is at the service of freedom, those 
who reject any such moves to instrumentalize philosophy. I 
wonder (or is this really a hope?) if we can get to the level 
of dedication to social change and respect and care for 
the marginalized which Silva seeks, that is, to a philosophy 
dedicated to struggle, without reducing philosophy to 
its service as a tool of social change. I am not interested 
in preserving the purity of philosophy or of granting 
it any queen-like status, but I am also concerned that 
particularizing its tasks too narrowly could do precisely the 
damage that has been inflicted upon the Latin American 
philosophical tradition by years of neglect, namely, such a 
move could silence important voices of that tradition, not 
because they speak the wrong language (Spanish), but 
rather because they write about the wrong things (logic, 
the beauty of the Andean mountains, truth as propositional 
versus truth as existential, etc.).
Silva clearly articulates why we need to address the Latin 
American philosophical tradition in a new way in order to 
overcome the dismissive ways it has been received by 
the Anglophone philosophical tradition. In his paper he 
also carves out a much needed intellectual space in which 
to understand the problems fueling the Latin American 
philosophical tradition. Silva’s paper is part of a project 
to combat exclusion and silencing of a tradition that he 
is indeed imbuing with a new, stronger voice. Yet, that 
voice becomes exclusionary at points. I fear that Silva is 
addressing an injustice and then creating a new injustice. 
As he writes:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to think as a Latin 
American and not be concerned with colonization 
or a derivative subtopic in some way. To not do so 
requires conscious effort and willful ignorance, the 
type of which is morally culpable. 
This matter of “thinking as a Latin American” sounds 
rather essentialist to my ears, and to link that thinking to 
a particular subject matter, i.e., colonization, and then to 
attribute nefarious motives in the absence of such subject 
matter, to any given thinker, seems a lot like thought 
control, which, it seems to me, would not make for the 
development of healthy, progressive philosophy, but 
rather would result in ideology. Silva makes a claim in direct 
opposition to this point when he writes, “For one to grow 
up amidst colonial oppression, experience it, or perhaps 
even benefit by it, and yet not think philosophically about 
it takes a tremendous amount of effort. To not write about it 
means that one is an ideologue, which, in Ellacuría’s sense 
of the term, implies that one is a denier of life.” No one 
wants to be an ideologue—the ideology that concerns me 
is the ideology that denies freedom. Silva may be guilty 
of condemning Latin American philosophers to doing 
philosophy in a particular way, of scripting them too tightly. 
Philosophy Born of Colonial Struggle: One 
Theme or the Whole Story of the Latin 
American Philosophical Tradition?
Elizabeth Millán Brusslan
DEPAUL UNIVERSITY
In his ambitious paper, “Why the Struggle Against 
Coloniality Is Paramount to Latin American Philosophy,” 
Grant Silva identifies several problems with attempts to 
define Latin American philosophy and then suggests what 
he takes to be a more promising path towards a definition 
of the tradition. Silva uses the themes of colonization, 
liberation, and creativity to guide his account of Latin 
American philosophy, an approach that is promising. As 
he puts it, Latin American philosophy is “philosophy born 
of colonial struggle”; as such, he adds, “[w]hatever Latin 
American Philosophy (LAP) may be, philosophy at the 
service of freedom plays a crucial role in the tradition I 
am concerned with.” Colonial struggle and freedom are 
enduring themes in the Latin American philosophical 
tradition. The hybrid identity of Latin America—a troubling 
mix of European and American influences and complexes—
and the ensuing problems said identity have created for 
the recognition of Latin American philosophy as having any 
clear space on the traditional map of philosophy have led 
to an enduring crisis of identity which has generated what 
might be called an excessive cycle of self-criticism and 
self-questioning within its philosophical tradition. Silva’s 
focus on colonial struggle and his push to emphasize the 
contributions of the Latin American tradition to social and 
political issues in their most concrete forms (that is, in the 
voices of the oppressed, the poor, and the marginalized) is 
a valuable contribution to the endemic problem of defining 
Latin American philosophy and defending its original 
contributions. I think that if developed in detail, the path 
Silva offers us would lead us to a richer understanding both 
of what Latin American philosophy offers and of how to 
come to an understanding of central texts from the tradition 
of Latin American philosophy. 
From the outset, however, I was troubled by the emphasis 
on philosophy at the service of freedom. First, because the 
term “freedom” is a difficult one, so we need to be given 
a careful account of it if it is going to give movement to 
the case Silva is making in his paper. The term “freedom” 
seems to open up a host of issues that would have to be 
addressed before we could use the description that Silva is 
offering. At one point in the paper, in taking Jorge Gracia to 
task for rejecting coloniality as the basis for understanding 
Latin American philosophy, Silva does laud Gracia’s anti-
essentialism and his turn to a familial-historical model 
for understanding group identities. As Silva writes: “Both 
are worthwhile contributions to philosophy of race and 
ethnicity, and . . . epitomize a Latin American philosophical 
concern with freedom from totalizing concepts, the type 
of which are typified by colonial impositions.” So, is the 
freedom at stake in Silva’s account a type of “freedom 
from totalizing concepts”? Being more specific about the 
freedom informing his view that Latin American philosophy 
is a kind of philosophy at the service of freedom would help 
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inevitable exclusions that come with such approaches, 
perhaps we should focus on the exclusions within the 
tradition so that we can continue to make the tradition 
more and more inclusive as we strive to achieve for the 
Latin American philosophical tradition the recognition that 
it deserves.
Doing Away with Juan Crow
José Jorge Mendoza
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL
In May of 2008, Roberto Lovato wrote an article for The 
Nation magazine entitled “Juan Crow in Georgia.” Lovato’s 
article begins in a manner that is now familiar to those of 
us who pay close attention to the plight of DREAMers:1 it 
tells us about a sympathetic young person, living in the 
United States under less than ideal circumstances, who 
nonetheless has a big American dream. In this particular 
case, the young person in question is fifteen-year-old Marie 
Justeen Mancha. At the time, Mancha was living with her 
mother in Reidsville, Georgia. The two of them had recently 
migrated to Reidsville and were eking out a meager 
existence by working in onion fields and living out of what 
Lovato describes as a battered old trailer. We are also told 
that, despite the seemingly long odds, Mancha plans to 
one day go to college and become a clinical psychologist. 
In September of 2006 her dreams were put in jeopardy. 
As Mancha was getting ready to go to school, armed 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents raided 
her trailer. These agents had neither warrants, probable 
cause, nor permission to enter Mancha’s residence, but 
they entered anyway and interrogated Mancha over her 
and her mother’s immigration status. At the end of this 
interrogation, the agents simply left. Mancha and her 
mother were not deported. Tragedy was averted because, 
as Lovato informs us, Mancha and her mother were: “the 
wrong kind of ‘Mexicans’; they were US citizens.”2
According to Lovato, Mancha’s experience is not an isolated 
incident, but part of a larger and more troubling trend. As 
he writes:
Mancha and the younger children of the mostly 
immigrant Latinos in Georgia are learning and 
internalizing that they are different from white—
and black—children not just because they have the 
wrong skin color but also because many of their 
parents lack the right papers. They are growing up 
in a racial and political climate in which Latinos’ 
subordinate status in Georgia and in the Deep 
South bears more than a passing resemblance 
to that of African-Americans who were living 
under Jim Crow. Call it Juan Crow: the matrix of 
laws, social customs, economic institutions and 
symbolic systems enabling the physical and 
psychic isolation needed to control and exploit 
undocumented immigrants.3
For a philosopher who is placing freedom at the center of 
his inquiry, this lack of freedom granted to philosophers in 
Latin America seems particularly out of place. Silva seems 
resigned to accepting exclusions, writing, “My goal is not 
to exclude, but undoubtedly, this will be a consequence of 
my project. Instead, my goal is to preserve the tradition of 
thought in LAP that stands out in comparison to Anglophone 
understandings of philosophy.” I think that Silva’s desire to 
preserve the tradition of LAP is of the highest value, and I 
think that he, in fact, has the elements not only to preserve 
but to revive and lead the tradition in new, tradition-
affirming directions. But I don’t think we need to accept 
exclusions born of scorning Latin American thinkers who 
are not concerned with colonization in order to carry out 
the valuable project that Silva has delineated in his paper.
Part of my discomfort with such exclusions is that in 
such moves of exclusion and of scripting who and what 
counts as a Latin American philosopher we ghettoize 
the very tradition we are attempting to preserve, revive, 
and develop. Latin American philosophy and Spanish-
speaking philosophers remain ghettoized. We have special 
committees to oversee the treatment of Hispanics in 
philosophy, in part because inclusiveness of this group 
cannot be taken for granted. We have to market sessions 
at the American Philosophical Association meetings so 
that they will appeal to mainstream philosophers: logic 
in Brazil is a crowd pleaser, while the topic of indigenous 
thought in America draws only a few eccentrics. The theme 
of German philosophy in the Americas is seen as more 
valuable than addressing the problem of modernity in Latin 
American, for the stentorian philosophical voice of the 
German tradition inevitably overpowers the muffled voice 
of the Latin American tradition. Paying serious attention to 
something like the problem of modernity in Latin America 
would surely be a sign of progress, of an overcoming of 
the “colonial condition” in which we have placed Latin 
American philosophy, for it would present Latin American 
thought in an autonomous light. But we cannot secure 
such autonomous light by limiting the freedom of Latin 
American thinkers, preventing them from taking their 
thought where their questions lead them. Whether we 
think the resulting work is good or bad is one matter, and 
we might even agree that the best work done within the 
tradition of Latin American philosophy is the work that deals 
explicitly with the colonial condition. But to deny that a 
given contribution by a Latin American thinker simply does 
not belong to the tradition because of its content seems 
not only wrong but damaging to the very future of the 
tradition. Colonial struggle is a central problem of the Latin 
American philosophical tradition, but why must we create a 
hierarchy according to which only those contributions that 
address this matter are really Latin American philosophical 
contributions—why not acknowledge that the tendency 
of thought within the Latin American tradition that deals 
with colonial struggle is a central one, a tendency that has 
shaped many of the valuable contributions of that tradition, 
while also acknowledging that there are other tendencies? 
Even if we cannot offer final words on what Latin American 
philosophy is, certainly we can all agree that there is a 
vast territory of themes and figures, of questions and of 
proposed answers to those questions. Rather than looking 
for exhaustive definitions and becoming entangled in the 
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citizen of the European Union and of the city of Berlin, and 
therefore be lawfully present in Germany and eligible to 
vote in certain elections, even though s/he is not a German 
citizen. Federalism therefore offers an immigration reform 
alternative that is both consistent with democratic norms—
especially with regard to democratic representation at the 
transnational and local levels—and more open borders. 
Within the immigration debate, Thomas Pogge, Veit Bader, 
Seyla Benhabib, and to some extent William Flores and 
Renato Rosaldo, have championed some version of this 
view.10
For supporters of immigrant rights, this approach seems 
to hold a lot of promise. After all, while attempts at 
comprehensive immigration reform have stalled at the 
national level, over the last decade there has been a 
groundswell of local and state ordinances that seek to 
protect immigrants and extend benefits to all residents 
(including undocumented immigrants). For example, cities 
such as San Francisco, Denver, and New York now prohibit 
city employees (including police offers) from inquiring into 
people’s immigration status and, in general, are refusing to 
let their local resources be used to help enforce national 
immigration laws. There have also been actions taken at 
the state level, where states such as California, Washington, 
and Nebraska have granted driver’s licenses, in-state 
tuition, and health care to all of their residents regardless 
of immigration status. And even states that support stricter 
immigration enforcement, such as Texas and Utah, have 
proposed their own guest worker programs tailored to 
their own particular needs, rather than the current one-
size-fits-all national model. While guest worker programs 
are not always great, if these state-level programs were to 
be implemented, many undocumented workers currently 
working in those states would be given legal status.
Conservatives in the United States have complained that 
these actions are unconstitutional and that local and state 
governments have over reached and should be punished 
by the national government. However, a generous reading 
of the U.S. Constitution would suggest that conservatives 
are wrong and that these local and state governments 
are on firm constitutional ground. For example, the U.S. 
Constitution only twice mentions matters directly relating 
to immigration, and neither time does it say much about 
where the power to establish immigration policy should 
reside.11 Along with this, there is the Tenth Amendment (i.e., 
the federalist amendment), which states that “the powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” When read in this way, it 
seems that there is nothing explicitly unconstitutional 
about the aforementioned actions taken by local and state 
governments.
PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE: THE TYRANNY OF 
CENTRALIZED POWER
Despite the reading I have just provided, there is a long 
history backed by judicial precedent that has allowed the 
U.S. national12 government to consistently usurp the power 
to control immigration and exercise it in questionable ways. 
For example, in 1798 President John Adams signed into law 
In the passage above, Lovato is both describing the wrong 
of Juan Crow and alluding to its connection to Jim Crow. 
While there are some very important differences between 
the two, Lovato seems to be suggesting that Juan Crow is 
similar to Jim Crow in that they are both instances of local 
and state laws being used in a systematic way to violate the 
civil rights and equal protection of minority citizens. In this 
essay, I would like to explore the implication Juan Crow has 
for an ethics of immigration. I want to argue that Juan Crow 
poses a challenge not only to federalist approaches to 
immigration reform, but to any immigration reform that has 
stricter enforcement as a key component. Instead, I want to 
suggest that a just immigration reform must adhere to two 
standards, equality of burdens and universal protections, 
and that only by doing so can the potential for Juan Crow 
be accurately avoided.
THE FEDERALIST ALTERNATIVE
Philosophers working on the ethics of immigration face an 
interesting challenge. It is assumed that political legitimacy 
requires a community to be both democratically self-
determined and respectful of human rights. Yet the issue of 
immigration (maybe more so than any other issue) exposes 
a deep tension between these two commitments.4 For 
example, a commitment to democratic self-determination 
would seem to suggest that a political community has a 
presumptive right to control its borders and determine its 
own criteria for citizenship.5 However, a commitment to 
individual freedom or universal equality (i.e., the pillars of 
human rights) seems to speak in favor of open borders; 
either because respecting an individual’s right to freedom 
of movement is weighty enough to override most of the 
reasons a political community would have to deny him 
or her admission6 or because restrictive borders help to 
perpetuate or create unjust global inequalities.7 
This is an exaggerated and simplistic way of situating the 
current philosophical debate over immigration, so it’s worth 
mentioning that there are other nuanced positions that do 
not fit nicely into this neat division. For example, Arash 
Abizadeh has argued that a commitment to democratic 
norms would entail political communities not have the 
unilateral right to control their borders,8 while Peter Higgins 
and Lea Ypi have argued that open borders would not 
necessarily promote universal equality and in fact could do 
the opposite.9 Still, the philosophical question surrounding 
immigration has primarily remained focused on how to best 
reconcile democratic self-determination with human rights.
Out of all the possible contenders that have emerged 
in this debate, the one that seems to hold the most 
promise is the federalist approach. Federalism advocates 
for a dispersed notion of sovereignty, where political 
authority over a territory is allowed to operate at various 
levels. These different levels usually have one top level, 
for example, a central government or a supranational 
institution, and smaller subdivisions operating underneath, 
such as provincial, state, or local governments. On this 
model, the power to make and enforce laws operates 
on all these different levels with each enjoying a certain 
degree of autonomy. On this model, people do not need 
to be members at every level in order to obtain certain 
citizenship rights. For example, a person could be a 
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to that extent is an incident of every independent 
nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could 
not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject 
to the control of another power.15
This case, along with the other Chinese exclusion cases, has 
come to form the legal backbone of what is known as the 
Plenary Power Doctrine. This doctrine gives the U.S. national 
government a monopoly over the regulation of immigration, 
meaning its exercise of power in this area is not subject 
to judicial review. The lack of judicial review means that, 
with regard to cases involving the admission, exclusion, 
and deportation of noncitizens, constitutional protections 
(e.g., right to a trial by jury, right to court appointed legal 
representation, and freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures) are not applicable.16
These examples do not exhaust the list of abuses, but they 
are sufficient to underscore the following worry: there is a 
very real danger in a centralized approach to immigration 
policy because when given discretionary control over the 
admission, exclusion, and deportation of noncitizens, 
national governments have shown themselves incapable 
of not using this power in morally or politically problematic 
ways. In light of this worry, a federalist approach to 
immigration reform seems much more appealing. After all, 
federalism offers a way to break up or at least check the 
concentration of power without at the same time having to 
give up the notion of sovereignty (i.e., self-determination). 
With that said, however, there is an underside to federalism, 
and this underside is nowhere better exemplified than in 
the case of Jim Crow.
THE UNDERSIDE OF FEDERALISM AND THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE
As most people are aware, the U.S. Civil War put an end 
to chattel slavery and annulled the infamous Dred Scott 
decision that had denied U.S. citizenship to people of 
African descent. These achievements were constitutionally 
enshrined with the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments. Immediately after the 
passage of these amendments, however, local and state 
governments of the former Confederacy began to pass 
their own laws in an effort to circumvent the spirit of these 
amendments. These laws appeared neutral on the surface, 
but when implemented, they created a legalized form of 
racial segregation. 
The constitutionality of these laws were tested and 
notoriously upheld in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases and the 
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson case. These cases provided the legal 
precedent for what came to be known as the “separate but 
equal” doctrine. This doctrine basically stated that so long 
as facilities and institutions were equal, racial segregation 
was not in itself a breach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection clause. The ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson 
is especially disconcerting for proponents of federalism 
because in making its case the state of Louisiana appealed 
specifically to the Tenth Amendment (i.e., the federalist 
amendment) and won the case on those grounds. 
a set of bills that have come to be known as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. These bills were signed in the aftermath of 
the French Revolution, during a time that is now commonly 
referred to as the Quasi-War with France. The stated aim 
of these bills was to root out the “Jacobin threat” posed 
by French immigrants. Among other things, these bills 
increased residency requirements for naturalization from 
five to fourteen years, made speech critical of the U.S. 
government into a punishable offense, and allowed the 
president to imprison or deport any non-citizen who was 
considered “dangerous” or who was a citizen of a hostile 
nation. 
In the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison presented a federalist response 
to these actions taken by the national government. 
Jefferson, for example, argued that these actions were 
unconstitutional because
if the acts before specified should stand, these 
conclusions would flow from them; that the 
General Government may place any act they think 
proper on the list of crimes & punish it themselves, 
whether enumerated or not enumerated by the 
Constitution as cognizable by them: that they may 
transfer its cognizance to the President or any 
other person, who may himself be the accuser, 
counsel, judge, and jury, whose suspicions may be 
the evidence, his order the sentence, his officer 
the executioner, and his breast the sole record of 
the transaction.13
Jefferson’s worry was that the national government, and 
specifically the executive branch, was using the threat of a 
foreign menace to consolidate powers that the Constitution 
had not intended for it to have. This consolidation of 
power was troubling for Jefferson because, even if these 
powers were intended only to be used on noncitizens, 
they eventually could be turned on citizens. As Jefferson 
warns further down in this resolution: “the friendless alien 
has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first 
experiment: but the citizen will soon follow, or rather has 
already followed; for, already has a Sedition Act marked 
him as its prey.”14
Another example of this questionable usurpation of power 
comes in the form of the explicit racist immigration laws and 
policies that began with the passage of 1875 Page Act. This 
act was the first of many acts to restrict the entry of nonwhite 
immigrants into the United States. During this period of 
explicitly racist national immigration policy, the Supreme 
Court consistently ruled in favor of the U.S. government 
by appealing to a more unitary (as opposed to federalist) 
understanding of U.S. sovereignty. For example, writing for 
the majority in the 1889 Chae Chan Ping v. United States 
case, Justice Stephen J. Field argued that Mr. Ping had no 
right to be readmitted into the United States, even though 
he had a government issued return voucher, because
the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its 
territory is a proposition which we do not think open 
to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory 
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immigrants are swarming into their territory and the 
national government has failed to do anything about it. 
This has encouraged them in turn to pass a variety of anti-
immigrant laws at the local and state level. The overall 
strategy these local and state governments have followed 
has been centered on enforcement, hence the mantras of 
“enforcement first” and “attrition through enforcement.” 
These laws are therefore not designed to try to reform or 
repair the current immigration system. Instead, they are 
aimed at obtaining better and more efficient enforcement 
of the current one. They also recognize the difficulty of 
rounding up and deporting 10-12 million undocumented 
immigrants, so along with bringing stricter enforcement 
these laws are also designed to try to make the day-to-day 
lives of undocumented immigrants so miserable that they 
begin to self-deport. 
As we saw in the opening case of Marie Justeen Mancha, 
not all Latino/as who migrate to parts of the former 
Confederacy are foreigners. In fact, most Latino/as in the 
United States are a lot like Mancha, U.S.-born citizens who 
are nonetheless being forced to bear the brunt of anti-
immigrant laws and policies. In this regard we find the 
similarity to Jim Crow. The anti-immigrant laws that have 
come out of “enforcement first” and “attrition through 
enforcement” approaches to immigration reform are being 
passed at the local and state level by an overwhelming 
democratic majority, and they also appear neutral on the 
surface. When these laws are put into effect, however, they 
have a disparate impact on a particular minority segment of 
the citizenry (i.e., Latino/as). If the comparison to Jim Crow 
is warranted, then the recent actions taken by the Obama 
administration seem consistent with the earlier actions 
taken by presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. 
In response to Juan Crow, the Obama administration 
has sued the state of Arizona for its “attrition through 
enforcement” inspired Senate Bill. In 2012 this lawsuit 
went before the Supreme Court, where Arizona defended 
its actions in the same way Louisiana had in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, by appealing to the Tenth Amendment. This time, 
however, the court found that Arizona’s anti-immigration 
bill was largely unconstitutional. It was unconstitutional 
not because of the harm it would cause foreigners or 
even Latino/a citizens, but because its actions violated 
the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause is found in 
Article XI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and it states 
that when national law conflicts with state law, national 
law wins out. This is commonly referred to as preemption, 
and it gives the national government exclusive power to 
legislate over such areas as war and commerce.
Following this victory in the courts and at the behest of 
DREAMer activists, President Obama went on to issue an 
executive order granting deferred action (i.e., protection 
from deportation) to undocumented immigrants who 
entered the country before the age of sixteen (i.e., DACA). 
This past November, Obama extended this deferred 
action to include undocumented immigrants who are the 
parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents (i.e., 
DAPA). This latter action, however, has been challenged 
by 26 states and its constitutionality is still currently being 
debated in the courts. Again, most of the states that have 
Jim Crow segregation was legally in effect throughout 
the former Confederacy from the end of Reconstruction 
(1877-ish) until the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision. The Brown decision, however, did not by itself 
settle the matters. In 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval 
Faubus defied the court’s decision by calling out the state’s 
National Guard in an effort to prevent black students from 
entering Little Rock Central High School and made an 
appeal to “state’s rights” in justifying his actions. President 
Eisenhower responded to Faubus’s actions by deploying 
the U.S. army and nationalizing Arkansas’s National Guard. 
In 1963, Alabama Governor George Wallace—living up 
to his inaugural address promise of “segregation now, 
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever”—had his 
infamous “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” debacle where 
he physically stood at the entrance to the University of 
Alabama in order to prevent black students from enrolling. 
Again, it took executive action, this time on the part of 
President Kennedy, to remove him.
It seems that one lesson that can be gleamed from the 
struggle against Jim Crow is that when local or state 
governments deny members of disadvantaged social 
groups their civil rights and equal protection, executive 
action at the national level can be an effective way of 
remedying the situation. This presents a further problem for 
proponents of federalism. The struggle against Jim Crow 
was successful not because of an increase in democratic 
procedures, since the majority of residents in Alabama 
and Arkansas would have likely favored segregation, or a 
decentralizing of power, as it took action at the national 
level to bring this practice to an end. It is in this vein that 
champions of immigrant rights, such as Representative Luis 
Gutierrez, have for years pleaded with President Obama to 
use his executive powers to act on immigration. 
The sense of urgency that proponents of immigrant rights, 
such as Gutierrez, feel stems from the fact that it is not 
only immigrants who are being negatively affected by 
Congress’s inability to pass comprehensive immigration 
reform; U.S. citizens are also being negatively impacted by 
this gridlock. In recent years, citizens like Marie Justeen 
Mancha have been migrating in greater numbers to parts 
of the United States where historically Latino/as have not 
resided in large numbers. Specifically, Latino/as have 
started to make homes for themselves in parts of the 
former Confederacy. The immediate assumption by many 
of the residents in these parts is that these new migrants do 
not belong. Some of the worries these residents have are 
driven by xenophobic attitudes and beliefs, but some truly 
believe that these new migrants are all undocumented and 
their presence is evidence that the national government 
is failing to do its job of enforcing immigration law. This 
despite the fact that the actual number of undocumented 
immigrants has remained steady for close to a decade, 
somewhere between 10-12 million, and in recent years has 
actually seen a decline. Also, since President Obama took 
office in 2009, the U.S. government has been deporting 
close to 400,000 undocumented immigrants a year, which 
is more than under any other previous administration. 
Regardless of these facts, the public perception in 
states of the former Confederacy is that undocumented 
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access to certain benefits, while at the same time precluding 
the possibility of draconian immigration enforcement.
IMMIGRATION REFORM WITHOUT JUAN CROW
In my view, an ideal approach to immigration reform only 
appears to want it both ways. It gains this appearance from 
how the debate over immigration has played out in the 
United States, as a contest between the Supremacy Clause 
(i.e., the national government’s check on federalism gone 
amuck) and the Tenth Amendment (i.e., state’s rights). 
When the immigration debate is framed in this way, the 
point that Marie Justeen Mancha’s story is supposed to 
drive home gets overlooked. The fight against Juan Crow 
is less about locating the power to control immigration and 
more about circumventing that power, at every level, so 
that certain segments of the citizenry do not get ostracized 
when and if it gets exercised. This suggests that, regardless 
of whether a country chooses to adopt a more centralized 
or federalist approach to immigration reform, the important 
question to address is how should enforcement be limited?
The answer I propose is that immigration enforcement 
should have to adhere to something like the following two 
standards: equality of burdens and universal protections. An 
equality of burdens standard would require that whatever 
burdens result from the enforcement of immigration policy, 
those burdens should be allocated as equally as possible 
among the citizenry. For example, if agents are allowed to 
conduct raids on private homes or places of work, then 
every citizen’s home or place of work should potentially 
be as likely to be raided as any other citizen’s home or 
place of work. I understand this might make immigration 
enforcement less efficient, but there are at least two good 
reasons why the implementation of this standard outweighs 
this concern. 
First, it would make citizens more reflective about the kind of 
enforcement they are willing to let their government deploy. 
Since most citizens currently do not feel like they have much 
to worry about with internal immigration enforcement, the 
majority has shown itself to be increasingly willing to have 
stricter immigration enforcement, even when this increase 
negatively impacts the lives of minority citizens. By having a 
majority, and not just a minority, of citizens share in the cost 
of stricter enforcement, the excesses of this enforcement 
will not only be more fairly distributed, they will also impact 
decisions about the quality and quantity of enforcement.
Second, while this standard might not change deeply 
entrenched social attitudes on race, ethnicity, or culture, 
it will prevent those attitudes from unduly influencing 
enforcement and in the process self-affirm negative 
stereotypes about minority groups. While some might 
argue that this standard would prohibit all forms of selective 
enforcement, it would actually only prohibit selective 
enforcement when it disproportionately harms citizens for 
morally arbitrary reasons (e.g., race, ethnicity, or culture). In 
other words, while it might be okay for enforcement agents 
to focus more of their attention on people who self-identify 
as members of an outlaw motorcycle gang (e.g., wear a 
particular kind of leather jacket), as this is not a morally 
arbitrary reason, it would not be okay for enforcement 
agents to focus more of their attention on people who 
challenged the president’s use of deferred action are states 
of the former Confederacy.
 For those who support immigrant rights, the recent actions 
taken by President Obama seem like cause for celebration. 
I want to suggest, however, that while these actions should 
be supported, they are at best incomplete and at worst 
Pyrrhic victories. President Obama has been able to provide 
undocumented immigrants with some relief through the 
use of executive action, but the way out of Juan Crow is not 
through executive action. Executive actions have a history 
of cutting both ways and so there are good reasons for 
being skeptical of them.
For example, three months after Japan bombed Pearl 
Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. 
This executive order forcefully removed between 110,000 
and 120,000 mostly U.S. citizens of Japanese descent from 
their homes and placed them in internment camps far away 
from the Pacific Ocean. The reason behind this removal was 
the belief that lurking within this particular segment of the 
citizenry were potential spies who would relay signals to 
the Japanese navy if allowed to remain close to the Pacific 
Ocean. The case of Japanese interment is now taken to be 
one of the more disgraceful moments in U.S. history, but it 
is still important as a poignant reminder of how executive 
action can cut both ways. The actions of the executive 
branch can at times be used to protect the most vulnerable 
in our society, such as the actions by Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
or Obama might exemplify, but they can also be fueled by 
or be used to pursue racist or xenophobic ends. 
A further complication with looking to the national 
government to provide relief from Juan Crow is that most 
of the enforcement measures that give rise to Juan Crow 
are already present at the national level. For example, 
the national immigration and welfare reform laws that 
were passed in 1996 allow the national government to 
commandeer local police for immigration enforcement 
duties, require employers to check the immigration status 
of their employees, and make immigrants ineligible for 
various sorts of benefits such as welfare and Medicare.17 
Again, while the letter of the law does not single out any 
particular social group, its application has disproportionately 
impacted citizens of non-European descent and especially 
U.S.-born children whose parents lack proper immigration 
status.
Federalist and centralized approaches to immigration 
reform therefore seem to leave us in a kind of quagmire: 
giving the national government too much discretion over 
immigration has historically proven problematic (e.g., 
Alien and Sedition Acts and Chinese Exclusion Acts), but 
supporting the kind of federalism that would allow local 
and state governments to check the national government’s 
power and provide immigrants with some relief (e.g., offer 
them sanctuary, driver’s licenses, and in-state tuition) 
would also allow these governments to pass their own anti-
immigrant ordinances (e.g., Arizona’s SB 1070). An ideal 
approach to immigration reform (i.e., one that avoids the 
potential for Juan Crow) seems to want it both ways. It wants 
to allow local, state, and national governments to provide 
immigrants with some protections and unencumbered 
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of one’s own position on immigration, it is 
difficult to argue with the fact that what happened to Marie 
Justeen Mancha was unjust and that under a just regime 
those sorts of incidents should never occur. This belief is 
undergirded by an intuition that most of us share: legitimate 
political communities have a responsibility to treat their 
citizens as political equals and to not excessively or without 
warrant intrude on their lives. This intuition is expressed 
in what I have come to call the equality of burdens and 
universal protections standards. These two standards might 
not be enough to bring an end to racism or xenophobia, but 
adhering to them in immigration policy will prove sufficient 
to thwart the conditions that give rise to Juan Crow. 
It’s true that these standards limit the discretion political 
communities have in controlling immigration, and in 
today’s political climate a position like this is largely out 
of favor. With that said, however, I still think we need to 
ask ourselves whether sacrificing the civil rights and equal 
protection of a minority citizen is worth enforcing an 
immigration system that all sides agree is broken. Instead 
of doubling down and continuing to enforce such a system, 
why not be open to the possibility of radically revising it? 
Of adopting an immigration system that can be enforced 
in a just and fair manner because its policy for admissions 
reflects global realities as opposed to xenophobic fears? 
It’s true that such a revised system would likely entail much 
more open borders than most Americans are currently 
comfortable with, but then again no one ever said doing 
the right thing would be easy or popular.
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self-identify with a particular kind of religion (e.g., Islam) 
or different part of the world (e.g., Latin America) because 
those are morally arbitrary reasons.
Along with an equality of burdens standard, just 
immigration reform will also require something like a 
universal protections standard. This standard would 
complement the equality of burdens standard by requiring 
mechanisms for oversight and restrictions on excessive 
government coercion. It is difficult to say what specific 
types of oversight or restrictions this standard would entail, 
as different communities will have their own unique set of 
circumstances and challenges, but there does seem to be 
at least one universal restriction that this standard would 
always entail. There must at least be a “presumption of 
innocence” restriction. In the immigration context, this 
would mean that all persons present should be treated as 
though they are lawfully present until their status has been 
confirmed to be irregular and even then should be treated 
with the dignity that is owed to all human beings. 
In more concrete terms, if U.S. immigration enforcement 
policy were to adhere to something like a universal 
protections standard, it would need to give all persons 
present, regardless of their immigration status, such basic 
protections as the right to due process, equal protection 
under the law, freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, a right to an attorney, and protection from 
indefinite detention, which is currently not the case in 
removal proceedings.18 Protections like these are essential 
because without them immigration controls could easily 
infringe on both the rights of citizen and on human rights 
more generally.
When taken together, these two standards provide a 
canopy of protections that serve as a basis for immigrant 
rights. For example, one of the more odious aspects of 
current immigration law, which makes Juan Crow possible, 
is the commandeering of police officers for immigration 
enforcement purposes. This practice would be prohibited 
by these two standards because of its potential for abuse 
(e.g., police could use immigration enforcement as an 
excuse for harassing already marginalized communities), 
the risk that makes marginalized citizens even more 
vulnerable (e.g., victims of crimes, such as domestic 
violence, who also happen to live in mixed-status 
households could be hesitant to call police), and it would 
hinder the larger goal of fighting and preventing crime 
(e.g., undocumented immigrants are less likely to come 
forward to report or serve as witnesses for crimes if doing 
so might expose them to deportation, yet the safety of 
communities is dependent on the lawful cooperation of 
all persons present, regardless of immigration status). A 
similar argument can also be extended to include such 
areas as employment, home rentals, enrolling children in 
school, and many other everyday activities. An immigration 
policy that adheres to these two standards would prohibit 
enforcement schemes from intruding into these areas and 
by doing so would largely curtail the potential for Juan 
Crow.19
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White Supremacy, Guera/o-ness, and 
Colonization: An Argument for a Mexican-
American Philosophy
Andrew Soto
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will show how the slave trade, mestizaje, 
and U.S. laws are constitutive elements in the construction 
of Mexican-American identity. During the slave trade, the 
Spanish colonialist established white identity as a source 
of supremacy, protection, and civilization.1 Today, even 
as Mexican-Americans and U.S. law classifies Mexican-
Americans as white, they do not share the same protection 
and privilege associated with whiteness.2 Utilizing insights 
from legal history, I provide a contemporary framework 
that focuses, engages, and critically assesses the Mexican-
American struggle with his circumstance. Making use of 
the work of several Mexican-American scholars who expose 
contradictions that exist between the idea of the Mexican-
American and his actual circumstances, I show how Mexican-
American philosophy must be an intimate relationship 
between ideas and historical circumstances. Furthermore, I 
show how dominant-group-controlled institutions exercise 
control over Mexican-American culture.
COLONIAL CREATION OF THE MEXICAN-
AMERICAN
Since the late fifteenth century, Spanish colonialists 
developed a complex set of rules creating a race-based 
caste system with a distinct anti-black bias.3 Concerned with 
drawing distinctions between products of miscegenation, 
the Spanish divided offspring of mixed couples into 
three general groups: mestizo (Spanish-Indian), mulatto 
(Spanish-Black), and Zambo or Zambaigo (Black-Indian).4 
Mixing of these three groups created the Black mestizo and 
other subdivisions within these categories. The offspring of 
miscegenation union, called las castas, due to their African 
ancestry, occupied the lowest socio-economic status.5 As 
Taunya Lovel Banks notes in her essay, “Mestizaje and the 
Mexican Mestizo Self: No Hay Sangre Negra,” “to prevent 
Afro-mestizo slaves passing as Indians, masters often used 
hot irons to brand “the insignia of servitude” on slaves’ 
faces, or other places readily apparent to the observer.”6 The 
Spaniards created a class and racial system where “Spanish 
and white blood is redeemable . . . [and] inextricably linked 
to the idea of civilization . . . and Black blood bear[s] the 
stigma of slavery, [and] atavism and degeneracy.”7 The 
Spanish colonialists created a legal classification system 
based on hue or phenotype that birthed whiteness as 
the vanguard of redemption, reason, and humanity: 
“Afro-mestizos consistently tried to conceal their African 
ancestry because under rule, Indians had a higher socio-
economic status than castas . . . even free Afro-mestizos 
had an interest in hiding their African ancestry since by law 
mulattoes, but not mestizos, were subject to paying tribute 
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state and Supreme Court construct the Mexican-American 
race. In addition, federal agencies have an integral role 
in constructing the race of Mexican Americans.19 In 1930, 
the Census Bureau “used the term ‘Mexican’ to classify 
Mexican Americans, placing it under the rubric of ‘other 
races’ . . . according to this definition, Mexican Americans 
were not considered white.”20 “Interestingly, the Mexican 
government and the U.S. department of state both 
objected to the 1930 census definition of Mexican. Thus, in 
later years, Mexican Americans were classified as whites.”21 
Despite this, Mexican Americans do not share supremacy 
and protections that being white provides. They face 
discrimination, are victims of racial slurs, and are excluded 
from public facilities, neighborhoods, and employment 
opportunities:
Mexican Americans [are] earmarked for exclusive 
employment in the lowest brackets of employment 
and paid less than Anglo Americans for the same 
jobs. Moreover, law enforcement officials have 
committed widespread discrimination against 
Mexican Americans, arresting them on pretexts 
and meting out harassment and penalties 
disproportionately severe compared to those 
imposed on Anglos for the same acts.22
Thus, actual social behavior failed to reflect the legal 
norms that defined Mexican Americans as white. White as 
a matter of law failed to provide Mexican Americans with a 
privileged status.23
Instead, “Mexicans [are] co-whites when [it] suits the 
dominant group—and non-white when necessary to 
protect Anglo privilege and supremacy.”24 The mythical 
“American/whiteness” associated with Mexican Americans 
is a construction by the colonialist to keep the colonized 
Mexican-American subject in his inferior place. In this 
section, I have attempted to show how the race of 
the Mexican American, his/her whiteness, is a mythos 
constructed from slavery, the mestizaje, and U.S. laws. In 
the next section, I will show how institutions, e.g., the U.S. 
education system, exploit Mexican Americans to protect 
Anglo supremacy. Furthermore, I will show how this creates 
circumstances that force Mexican Americans to imitate, 
assimilate, and internalize their mythical whiteness.
WHITE SUPREMACIST INSTITUTION OF 
LEARNING
Since the 1930s, Mexican-American students have been 
victimized by inequities in educational access. The U.S. 
education system is one of, if not the, primary tools used 
to sustain white supremacy, forced assimilation, and the 
cultural genocide of Mexican culture. It is a violent tool 
that threatens the psychological and physical well-being of 
Mexican-American students. This system, permeated with 
Eurocentric curriculum, white administrators, and faculty 
vanguards, brainwashes Mexican-American students 
to believe they are Americans with all the rights and 
protections afforded to white students. As Juan F. Perea 
discusses in “Buscando América,” despite being classified 
legally white, Mexican-American students do not have the 
same rights and protections of white students:
Such analyses suggest, moreover, that we must look closer 
at the mestizaje paradigm and the role of the Atlantic 
slave trade in shaping and perpetuating racialized color-
caste, neo-colonial hierarchies in the United States and 
post-colonial hierarchies in other parts of the Americas.9 
As George A. Martinez notes in “Mexican Americans and 
Whiteness,”
During slavery, the racial divide between [B]lack 
and white became a line of protection from the 
threat of commodification: whiteness protected 
one against being an object of property. Even after 
slavery ended, it continued to be a valuable asset, 
carrying with it a set of assumptions, privileges, 
and benefits. Given this, it is hardly surprising that 
minorities have often sought to “pass” as white—
i.e., present themselves as white persons.10
Mexican-Americans have sought to pass as white because 
of the mythos surrounding access to public and private 
privileges and avoidance of being the object of others’ 
domination.11 Birthed from the colonial creation of the 
mestizaje, legal actors—courts and others—constructed 
the racial identity of Mexican Americans.12 In Inland Steel 
Co. v. Barcelona, the Indiana appellate court addressed 
the question whether Mexicans were white. Citing from 
the Encyclopedia Britannica that approximately one-fifth 
of the inhabitants of Mexico are white, approximately two-
fifths Indians, and the balance made up of mixed bloods, 
the court ruled that a “Mexican” should not be found to be 
a white person. Whether one was white or not would be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.13
In In re Rodriguez, a Texas federal court addressed whether 
Mexicans were white for purposes of immigration. As 
Martinez points out,
At the time, the federal naturalization laws required 
that an alien be white in order to become a citizen 
of the United States. The court stated that Mexicans 
would probably be considered non-white from 
an anthropological perspective, but went on to 
note that the United States had entered treaties 
with Mexico that expressly allowed Mexicans to 
become citizens of the U.S. Thus, the court held 
that Congress must have intended that Mexicans 
were white within the meaning of naturalization 
laws.14
In re Rodriguez and Inland Steel Co. v. Barcelona show 
how racial categories are constructed through political 
processes: “through the give and take of treaty making, 
Mexicans become ‘white.’”15 In In re Camille, “the court held 
that the son of a white Canadian father and an Indian mother 
was non-white, and therefore not eligible to naturalize.”16 
In In re Young, “the son of a German father and a Japanese 
mother was not a white person within the meaning of 
immigration laws.”17 If the courts decided these mixed 
races are not white, then Mexican-Americans—a mixture 
of Spanish and Indians—should also not be counted as 
white.18 Other cases, such as Independent School District 
v. Salvatierra, Hernandez v. State, Hernandez v. Texas, and 
Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, provide more evidence that the 
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language as an emblem of cultural identity, so do Mexicans. 
While the languages of the conquered and enslaved carry 
the low status assigned to their historically subordinated 
speakers, the language of the conquerors carries prestige, 
dominance, and power.33 Often, white teachers assume 
Mexican children are inherently culturally disadvantaged, 
come from “simple folk culture,” or their Mexican parents 
do not care about their education.34 Moreover, studies show 
that white teachers view their Mexican students as lazy and 
favor white students in class participation and leadership 
roles.35 As Perea points out, “such leadership opportunities, 
according to the teachers, were necessary to teach Anglos 
how to control and lead Mexicans.”36 As Richard Valencia 
discusses in his book, Dismantling Contemporary Deficit 
Thinking, white teachers often use a deficit-thinking model 
to implicate their failing students of color. Thus, Mexican 
students who fail to assimilate to American culture or take 
on white characteristics, linguistic codes, and attitudes are 
ostracized from the classroom and marked in permanent 
school records as special needs. “Assimilation, conceived 
as one-way adaptation by persons of color to the norms of 
whiteness and English monolingualism, was an important 
initial goal of American education for conquered people.”37 
U.S. schools have fought to eradicate Mexican culture and 
the Spanish language from the classroom. Schools have 
gone so far as to impose extensive disciplinary systems 
for students caught speaking Spanish. One student 
in a Texas school was detained for more than an hour, 
others spanked by their principal, suspended, expelled, 
publically humiliated, and physically abused for speaking 
Spanish.38 As Perea expresses, “these ‘no Spanish’ rules 
and disparaging attitudes toward native Spanish speakers 
are part of a system of behavioral controls intended to 
banish manifestations of ‘Mexicanness’ from the public 
schools.”39 Interpretation of law by lawyers, judges, and 
politicians plays an integral role in the historical plight of 
the Mexican student. Recently, a New York judge rejected 
a constitutional challenge to the poor quality of education 
provided to Mexican students who had dropped out of 
school by the eighth grade.40 The judge explained that an 
eighth grade education constituted a sound basic education 
because “[s]ociety needs workers in all levels of jobs, the 
majority of which may very well be low level.”41 The U.S. 
education system is designed for the purpose of educating 
Mexican Americans to accept their own inferiority and to 
be satisfied with the role of a manual laborer or to accept 
their new identity as assimilated Mexican Americans. 
In this section, I have attempted to show how the U.S. 
education system sustains white supremacy and is used 
as a tool to create the Mexican-American student. Starting 
from the slave trade and the mestizaje to U.S. laws and the 
U.S. education system, the Mexican American is created 
from the attempted annihilation and genocide of Mexican 
culture. In the next, and final, section, utilizing the work of 
Laura M. Padilla and Richard Delgado, I show how U.S. law 
forces Mexican Americans to internalize their whiteness 
and assimilate to U.S. culture.
CONCLUSION: THE GUERO/A MEXICAN-
AMERICAN
Internalized oppression, as noted by Laura M. Padilla, in 
Repercussions of Latinos’ Colonized Mentality, is when 
Today, Latinos are more segregated by race, 
poverty, and language than any other ethnic 
group. Latinos, by far, have the highest high 
school dropout rates of any group. In 2000, the 
status dropout rate for Latino students was 27.8%, 
more than twice the rate for Blacks and four times 
the rate for whites. Put another way, only 56% of 
Hispanics graduated from high school in 2000, 
while 88% of whites earned high school diplomas. 
Latinos rank last among major U.S. racial groups 
in their average level of educational attainment.25
In addition to these abysmal stats, Latino students are 
held back in school much more often than their peers and 
overrepresented in low-ability groups and classes.26 White 
teachers make up 90 percent of public school teachers in 
the U.S., while 40 percent of public school students in the 
U.S. belong to racial or ethnic minorities.27 These numbers 
are problematic because white teachers overwhelmingly 
control the destiny of students of color in public schools. 
Moreover, they control their placement into special 
education and advanced classes:
Similar imbalances can be seen in the number 
of individuals who are licensed to administer 
assessments. Because cultural, social, class, and 
linguistic biases often influence teacher and 
examiner perceptions of a student’s ability, students 
from racial and linguistic minorities continue to 
risk having their differences pathologized when 
measured against exclusionary, ethnocentric 
norms and standards.28 
As Lisa Delpit notes in Other People’s Children: Cultural 
Conflict in the Classrooms, there is a “culture of power” 
operating between predominantly white teachers and 
students of color. This culture of power results in white 
teachers “positing that the student who fails in school does 
so because of his/her internal deficits or deficiencies. Such 
deficits manifest, adherents allege, in limited intellectual 
abilities, linguistic shortcomings, lack of motivation to 
learn, and immoral behavior.29 Thus, the more students are 
complacent or assimilated inside white classrooms, the 
less they are seen as manifesting internal deficits. One of 
the most effective tools to assimilate Mexican students 
is through language. Students learn best in the language 
they understand best, which for many but certainly not all 
Mexican students is Spanish.30 “Yet bilingual education in 
our schools—particularly the more effective type that seeks 
the maintenance of Spanish and the acquisition of English—
runs directly counter to strong traditions of Anglocentric 
assimilation and homogenization.”31
As Perea explains, “recent census figures show that 17.9% of 
U.S. residents speak languages other than English at home, 
and of these, 10.7% of U.S. residents speak Spanish. Latinos 
account for 70.9% of school-age children who speak a 
language other than English at home. After English, Spanish 
is . . . the most prominent language spoken in the United 
States.”32 Despite the prominence of Spanish speakers in 
the U.S., particularly among Mexican school children, they 
are treated as inferiors and discriminated against by English-
speaking America. Just as English speakers see their 
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According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Mexican Americans 
will become the majority in the U.S. by 2044.49 In spite of 
this predominance, since Mexican Americans are legally 
classified as whites, and many wear their Americanness 
or whiteness as a badge of accomplishment and honor, 
colonialism and white supremacy will adapt and morph 
itself into a new and more oppressive system. Richard 
Delgado, in “The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of 
Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox,” 
notes how U.S. law tends to resists change, unless it meets 
the interest and benefits of whites: “any text, including a 
legal one, is interpreted against a background of meanings, 
presumptions, and preexisting understandings. If a parent 
tells a child, ‘clean up your room,’ the terms ‘clean’ and 
‘room’ have relatively well agreed-upon meanings: the 
child knows he or she is not expected to launder the 
drapes or vacuum the attic space above the room.”50 Legal 
commands work in the same way. For example, “when 
Brown vs. Board of Education ordered school districts to 
desegregate ‘with all deliberate speed,’ southern officials 
interpreted the decree in terms of their common sense 
. . . integration that went not too far, not too fast, and that 
left the school system as intact as possible.”51 Preexisting 
social practices, including friendship patterns; the way 
teachers, librarians, bus drivers, shop owners, and land 
owners deal with Mexican children and their families; and 
who is chosen for student body president, the debate 
team, and the cheerleading squad, continue to greatly 
hinder the Mexican child’s life, even if policies and school 
assignment rules change.52 Another component that affects 
the reception of a legal decision or rule is the backdrop of 
narrative or stories against which the new element will be 
forced to operate.53 Courts are confronted with a host of 
narrative and social perceptions that generate resistance, 
e.g.: “who are these outsiders trying to tell us what to 
do?”; “[Mexicans] just want to push into where they are 
not wanted”; “they want things they don’t deserve and 
haven’t earned.”54 As Delgado points out, these narratives 
could theoretically change, but they tend to change very 
slowly, in part because we interpret new experiences 
and new narratives in terms of the old ones—the ones 
we hold. These narratives, moreover, form the basis for 
understanding new experiences.55 When courts enforce 
new decrees, hundreds of lower-level bureaucrats, state 
officials, and lower court judges will interpret the ringing 
words according to their common sense understandings 
about persons, relations, and what is just and deserved.56 
Thus, “the combined effect of the forces just mentioned 
means that any reform measure other than the smallest 
and most incremental will meet predictable resistance, 
reinterpretation, and obstruction in ways that the legal 
system is ill equipped to manage and counter.”57 If law and 
U.S. institutions are powerless to effect social revolutions, 
then what options do Mexican-Americans have to attain 
equality? The first step must be to establish a specialization, 
such as Mexican-American philosophy, where Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans can study and celebrate their own 
people’s culture and history. Mexican-American philosophy 
must utilize and take seriously the voices of all Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans who have a story to tell. Ultimately, 
Mexican-American philosophy must be a tool used to 
bridge the gap between Mexican Americans and Mexicans, 
and must provide Mexican Americans with the courage—
marginalized groups unconsciously turn on themselves 
by internalizing negative stereotypes that cause intra-
communal harm.42 These stereotypes, perpetuated by U.S. 
institutions, become interwoven in the spirit, body, and 
psychology of the Mexican American. An extension of the 
colonial mestizaje paradigm, many Mexican Americans pride 
themselves in Americanization and find comfort, privilege, 
and protection in a white identity. For example, several Latinos 
“voted in favor of California’s Proposition 187, which ended 
benefits for immigrants, and Proposition 209, which ended 
affirmative action in government contracting and public 
colleges and universities, precisely because they accepted 
negative stereotypes about themselves.”43 Recently, “a 
high percentage of Latinos supported Proposition 227, 
which proposed to end bilingual education in California. 
Additionally, a mostly Latino school board in New Mexico 
fired two teachers for teaching Chicano history to a group 
of predominantly Latino high school students.”44 When 
Mexican Americans internalize their whiteness they become 
enemies to their own people. Being guero or guera [light 
skinned], in many Mexican-American families, is preferred 
over darker skinned Mexican Americans. Mexican-American 
families succumb to the conditioning that white is better.45 
Internalization is also central when Mexican Americans 
experience self-doubt about their success upon receipt of 
either admission into a top university or a prestigious job 
offer.46 As Padilla notes, “because of internalized racism, 
we doubt our qualifications and hard-earned credentials, 
and succumb to the often not very delicate suggestions 
that we do not belong.”47 Mexican Americans who seek the 
recognition of their oppressor and assimilate into American 
culture lose contact with their own people, and worse, 
become protagonists in their culture’s genocide. Padilla 
presses: “the first and most essential step is conscious-
raising. If we do not recognize oppression and racism, we 
cannot overcome or undo them.”48 I agree with Padilla that 
conscious raising is an essential step to fighting internal-
oppression. 
The creation of a Mexican-American philosophy, rooted 
in the voices of Mexicans and Mexican Americans and 
their historical resistance, perseverance, heroicness, 
and struggle with colonialism, institutional racism, white 
supremacy, identity, and culture, is the strongest tool 
to bring about this awareness. Furthermore, Mexican-
American philosophy must be a tool Mexican Americans 
use to unmask and reveal the genius and superiority of 
their people. The Mexican American, as I have attempted 
to show in this paper, is an invention and residual symbol 
of Spanish coloniality. Today, state and federal laws, 
lawyers, politicians, judges, international treaties, and U.S. 
institutions sustain the mythos of the Mexican American. 
These institutions, such as the U.S education system, 
attempt to produce Mexican Americans who think white, 
act white, and protect the interests of white America. If 
Mexican Americans are legally classified as members of 
the white race, then why do they not share the benefits 
and privileges of white Americans? Is not the U.S. a 
democratic nation, where laws, votes, and government can 
easily change the social and material conditions of Mexican 
Americans? Or, is the Mexican American just a pawn on the 
white man’s chess board, used to manipulate and sustain 
white supremacy?
APA NEWSLETTER  |  HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY
FALL 2015  |  VOLUME 15  |  NUMBER 1  PAGE 24
38. Ibid., 602.
39. Ibid., 603.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Laura M. Padilla, “Repercussions of Latinos’ Colonized Mentality,” 
in The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Delgado 
and Jean Stefancic (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 
212. 
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 215.
48. Ibid., 214.
49. Paul Bedard, “Census: Whites Become ‘Minority” in 2044, Hispanic 
Population Twice Blacks,” Washington Examiner, Deember 15, 
2014, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/census-whites-
become-minority-in-2044-hispanic-population-twice-blacks/
article/2557393.
50. Richard Delgado, “The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of 
Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox,” in The 
Law Unbound! A Richard Delgado Reader, ed. Adrien Katherine 
Wing and Jean Stefancic (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 
246.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 247.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 248.
57. Ibid.
Portraits of Luis Villoro
Guillermo Hurtado
TRANSLATED BY KIM DÍAZ
FIRST PORTRAIT: THE HACIENDA
San Luis Potosí, México. A tall slim boy walks with his mother 
across the central square of an hacienda. The boy is just 
getting used to the geography and people from that place. 
Born in Barcelona, the son of a family who emigrated due to 
the Mexican Revolution, and who had been living in Europe 
for most of their lives. The mother and son come close to a 
group of peasants who wait for them with their hats in their 
hands and their heads tilted downwards. Villoro tells us:
All of them greeted me with great devotion 
because I was el patroncito, I was the son of their 
landlord. One of these Indians came to me with 
great reverence, took my hand and kissed it, this 
left a terrible impression on me, that this old man 
who was doing the hardest type of work in the 
fields and heat of the sun would come to me—a kid 
who had nothing to do with him, and respectfully 
kiss my hand. For me, this was at the same time an 
experience I felt to be deeply insulting, and which 
also made me feel an incredible amount of respect 
the cajones—to reject their Americanization and boldly 
claim their Mexicanness.
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has always insisted that not just anything can pass for 
philosophy, and much less for good philosophy. Genuine 
philosophy, according to him, should be the rigorous 
exercise of an autonomous reason, and above everything 
else, of reason in the service of life.
SECOND PORTRAIT: MASCARONES
The photograph taken by a street artist captures him 
walking by the Ribera de San Cosme in the company of 
Emilio Uranga and Ricardo Guerra. All three of them are 
very young, dressed up in suits and ties, and carrying books 
under their arms. They are smiling, and it is evident that they 
are enjoying the conversation between them. I imagine all 
three of them entering the tall doorway of the house built in 
the eighteenth century known as Mascarones, and walking 
into the yard of the Philosophy Department. There they stop 
to say hello to their fellow students, but promptly walk into 
the seminar room. The students take their seats and await 
the arrival of their teacher; José Gaos makes his entrance, 
places his books on the desk, takes a breath, and begins 
speaking. The students observe a concentrated silence. This 
is not an ordinary class, nor a teacher like any other. Villoro 
has mentioned that the only teacher he acknowledges 
as such is Gaos. It is impossible to understand Mexican 
philosophy in the twentieth century without the teachings 
of Gaos, the philosopher transterrado. His students were, 
besides Villoro, Leopoldo Zea, Emilio Uranga, Fernando 
Salmerón, Alejandro Rossi, to mention only the most 
prominent among them. Villoro belonged to the generation 
of Gaos’s students who called themselves El Hiperión, and 
who had their moment of major activity between 1948 
and 1952. This group proposed themselves two ambitious 
goals: on one hand, to philosophize in a strictly professional 
manner, with the highest level of originality and rigor; and 
on the other hand, to philosophize from and about their 
surrounding reality, to philosophize about México, about 
Latin America, not as another academic interest, but rather 
with the goal of transforming this reality, of shaking this 
reality up, of liberating it. Villoro’s large philosophical work 
is a testament to the strict fulfillment of both ideals—the 
criterion by which Mexican philosophy has been judged in 
the twentieth century. What distinguishes Villoro from the 
other Mexican philosophers of this period is that he has 
demonstrated more than anyone else that both ideals are 
not only compatible, but also complimentary. Unfortunately, 
this lesson has not been thoroughly learned and must 
be repeated. Villoro’s message to Latinamericanists is 
that an engaged and liberating philosophy must also be 
professional and rigorous, and to analytic philosophers, 
his message is that a clear and rigorous philosophy which 
does not attempt to reflect autonomously, nor attempt to 
search for the relevance with its own reality, will be nothing 
more than a borrowed philosophy. This is how Villoro wrote 
about this in an exchange he had with Leopoldo Zea:
By “rigorous philosophy” one should not 
understand an academic type of philosophy, 
informed by the latest publications in English 
or German. It also does not mean an aseptic 
philosophy in the face of the motivating reality 
that the philosopher lives. Rigorous philosophy 
simply means a philosophy that with the exercise 
of proper reason, attempts to take to the logical 
for this person, this old man. This experience 
stayed with me throughout my life (I think my 
book) Los Grandes Momentos del Indigenismo en 
México (. . .) is due largely to the experience I had 
that day.1
Villoro is referring to his first book, published in 1950, when 
he was twenty-eight years old. The subject of Mexican 
Indians, however, has preoccupied him throughout his life. 
And I say that it has preoccupied him and not merely been 
of interest to him because for him, this has to do with a 
problem that touches the most profound fibers of his being. 
Villoro does not lose sleep over the Indian as an abstract 
concept, but as a concrete human being. Villoro has 
extended this concern towards all those who suffer some 
type of exclusion, in other words, some type of injustice. 
The exercise of reason, and especially that of philosophical 
reason, has always been for Villoro the exercise of a life-
giving type of reason. Villoro’s more theoretical and 
abstract works have ultimately been preoccupied with 
the existential, the moral, and the political, in the best 
sense of this tarnished word. We could say that Villoro has 
always believed in the liberating power of reason. This is 
why he has sought to offer us a philosophical vision of 
reason—without falling into skepticism or nihilism—that 
is worthy of mankind. This is how we should understand, 
I believe, the original theory of knowledge that he 
offered in Creer, saber y conocer. When he proposed his 
revisionist definition of knowledge, and did away with 
the requirement of truth, what he meant to do was to 
articulate a concept of knowledge that would allow us to 
better understand the epistemic practice in its historical 
dimension, but above all else, to better understand the 
epistemic practice in relation to its political practice. This 
is why there is such a close relationship between Creer, 
saber y conocer, which was published in 1982, and El Poder 
y el valor, published in 1997. The epistemic ethics of the 
first book leads to the political ethics of the second book; 
the epistemic communitarianism of the first book leads to 
the political communitarianism of the second book. Within 
the philosophical work of Luis Villoro, which spans over six 
decades, one can observe an extraordinary continuity of 
what has preoccupied and motivated him. One could say 
that the principal themes of his work have been as follows: 
the metaphysical understanding of otherness, the limits 
and reach of reason, the connection between knowledge 
and power, the search for community with others, the 
ethical reflection of injustice, the advocacy of respect 
towards cultural differences, and the critical dimension of 
philosophical thought. To develop these themes, Villoro 
has traveled an enormous philosophical territory. The 
list of authors over whom he has written with authority 
is long: Machiavelli, Descartes, Rousseau, Marx, Dilthey, 
Husserl, Marcel, Wittgenstein, Rawls, et cetera. Villoro 
traveled promptly through the main philosophical currents 
of the twentieth century: existentialism, phenomenology, 
Marxism, analytic philosophy. He passed through all of 
these without stopping too long in any one of them, 
without falling into the subsidiary fervor of so many of our 
colleagues. We could say that in all of these years, Villoro 
has cultivated a balanced philosophical pluralism. For him, 
not one philosophy should be taken as the True philosophy; 
none should be turned into dogma. Nevertheless, he 
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Philosophy is the disruptive activity of reason, 
and we can find reason at the limit of all scientific 
thought. Philosophy is not a profession; it is a form 
of thought. The type of thought that laboriously 
attempts again and again to conceive without ever 
actually achieving, that which is different, that 
which is removed from any society that claims to 
have a hold on reason. That which is different, that 
we never quite achieve, which is always sought 
through wonder and perplexity, is truthfulness in 
the face of prejudice, illusion, or lies, authenticity 
in the face of alienation, freedom in the face of 
oppression.3
I look at Villoro’s photograph reading his discourse. It is the 
image of a mature man, firm, in full capacity of his faculties, 
master of an enormous intellectual and moral prestige. This 
is a man who, had he wished to, could have taken leadership 
of the Secretaría de Educación Pública or any other position 
of this magnitude. If he did not, this was due to the loyalty 
he felt towards philosophy, understood not as the placid 
life led by the university professor or petite bourgeoisie 
researcher, but as a permanent criticism of political power. 
Not only of the government’s power in its functions and of 
the economic groups allied with it, but also of that smaller 
but not any less vicious political power that is exercised 
among the opposing parties and intellectual circles. Even 
though Villoro is a man of declared leftist politics, he has 
never defended any type of orthodoxy, not any type of 
leadership, as many of his other comrades have done. This 
is because for Luis Villoro, being a leftist does not mean one 
adopts a particular ideology; instead, it means to assume 
a moral posture that consists in adopting a disrupting 
attitude in the face of any oppressive power. This attitude 
is tied to an epistemic position that could be qualified as an 
anti-dogmatic fallibilism, and an understanding of reason 
as a type of dialogical plurality. This is why Villoro has stood 
up against the leftist ideologies and utopias that have been 
used to tyrannize people and exterminate dissidents. Villoro 
has never been a card-carrying member of any political 
party, in the sense that Ortega meant, but he has always 
been the type of man who is engaged with what he believes 
to be the best causes. Villoro formed part of a renowned 
group of intellectuals who, in the decades of the fifties 
and sixties, sought to restore the Mexican political system 
from its extremes. As already mentioned, his involvement 
in the student movement of 1968 was pivotal, and he has 
supported the political campaigns of various leftist parties. 
Outside of the country, his important role in UNESCO 
should also be remembered. But the relationship that he 
has had with the political movement that emerged in 1994 
with the Indigenous uprising in Chiapas is unparalleled. 
Villoro believes that the neo-zapatistas have traversed a 
hopeful route to political reform without committing the 
mistakes of traditional leftist movements. The democracy 
that Villoro has in mind is a direct democracy, deliberative, 
exercised among small communities—towns, work unions, 
neighborhoods—in which the assembly takes decisions 
by consensus, and in which the structures of domination 
and exclusion have been dismantled, or as the Mexican 
Indians say, “se manda obedeciendo,” one commands by 
serving. It seems to me that two political currents dovetail 
in Villoro’s thought that ultimately respond to two very 
conclusion, the examination of received opinions 
and doctrines. A philosophy that does not stop at 
vague rationalizations or rhetorical figures, and 
which does not take borrowed opinions postulated 
by others without submitting them to questions. 
Rigorous philosophy is reflection that aspires to 
be clear, precise, and radical. In this sense, all 
rigorous philosophy is liberating, but its liberating 
work does not consist in postulating action or 
political indoctrination, but rather in questioning 
the received beliefs...2
Villoro has been one of the main proponents of professional 
and engaged philosophy in our countries. He founded 
the journal Crítica in 1967 along with Alejandro Rossi and 
Fernando Salmerón. Crítica sought to be a space for the 
new directions of Iberoamerican philosophy. The acclaimed 
philosophy from the journal was a clear philosophy, rigorous, 
of good technical stripe, close to the sciences, and without 
folklorist inclinations, nor Weltanschauung pretentions. In 
1974, Villoro founded the Humanities and Social Sciences 
division of the Iztapalapa branch of the Universidad 
Autónoma Metropolitana. This was an academic experiment 
where philosophy was integrated with other disciplines. For 
the faculty constitution of the new department, Villoro hired 
analytic as well as Marxist philosophers. This speaks once 
again to his philosophical pluralism; but not so much to the 
pluralism of others, given that it did not take too long for 
the analytic and Marxist philosophers to begin quarreling. 
In any case, it is very revealing that many philosophers 
of all philosophical currents proudly declare themselves 
to be Villoro’s students. And since Villoro has cultivated 
with the same type of quality other disciplines such as 
intellectual history, cultural theory, and political criticism, 
his significance has spilled over the narrow boundaries of 
academic philosophy. The Mexican historians, sociologists, 
and anthropologists who consider Villoro’s work to have 
been inspiring and illuminating are not few. Those who had 
the good fortune to have attended his classes agree that 
he is the type of teacher who combines the qualities of 
the rigorous philosopher with those of the accomplished 
orator. Villoro has taken on the most difficult philosophical 
problems both in and out of the classroom with the qualities 
of clarity, intelligence, and passion that are so characteristic 
of him. These qualities manifest themselves in his writings. 
Villoro’s philosophical prose is—let us emphasize this—a 
model of how to write philosophy in Spanish.
THIRD PORTRAIT: EL COLEGIO NACIONAL
El Colegio Nacional occupies the building of the old 
Convento y Colegio de la Enseñanza in the center of Mexico 
City. Since its founding in 1943, el Colegio only had space 
for twenty members, but in 1972, President Luis Echeverría 
doubled this number. Rumor had it that the expansion of 
el Colegio was Echeverría’s strategy to coopt intellectuals 
who had distanced themselves from his regime after the 
massacre of 1968. No one, however, could have suggested 
this explanation when Villoro arrived in el Colegio on 
November 14, 1978. His incoming presentation infamously 
titled “Philosophy and Domination” is one of the strongest 
defenses of the critical role that philosophers ought to 
adopt in the face of political power. I cite the last words of 
this magnificent discourse. Villoro tells us:
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with other people, who are also I’s, is not only the source 
of morals, but also the source of our lives. In some way, 
Villoro had already discerned this antinomy in one of his 
first writings, “Solitude and Communion,” published in 
1949. There, Villoro tells us:
Love moves us to appropriate another, but, at 
the same time, it demands that the other remain 
independent; for if for one moment the other 
stopped being unyielding, the loving engagement 
would disappear; it would no longer be two 
different beings face to face, but only one in 
solitude. Similarly, the subject desires to give 
himself completely but, nevertheless, love is only 
sustained by what remains original of him in the 
face of the other, by what remains of his intact 
safeguard, by what remains of his intimacy: that 
which remains in solitude is only maintained by 
communion. And it is this way, that the fullest 
communion has latent in its bosom the most 
profound solitude.5
If the “I” is an illusion, then so is love; but it seems that 
Villoro’s heart refuses to accept such cold conclusion. At 
this point, a comparison with Octavio Paz may be revealing. 
Paz, influenced also by Asian thought, affirmed that the ‘I’ 
is a shadow of the personal pronoun, but he also refused 
to accept that love is a mere illusion. The comparison with 
Paz—in spite of all of their differences—may help us to 
emphasize a common characteristic of the thinkers of that 
generation, and this is that even though they were forever 
disillusioned with the utopias of modernity, they continued 
thinking that a rationality that is more modest and sensible 
towards the intimate fibers of life could mark a change for 
humanity in these dreary times.
FIFTH PORTRAIT: ESCUELAS PÍAS
Madrid, October 1st, 2007. In the site that the Escuelas Pías 
de San Fernando used to occupy, which today is a modern 
university center, Villoro listens to a tribute about his life 
and work. Suddenly the speaker is silent. He will have 
many more things to say, many more, but he hopes that his 
respectful silence will also be significant.
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deep aspects of his personality. On one hand, we can find 
a liberalism that confronts any and all types of oppressive 
authority, and on the other hand, a communitarianism that 
attempts to dissolve the egoism of the individual person. 
The possible tensions between these two currents are 
very well known by us: On one extreme the hegemonic 
power of the community has the potential to suffocate the 
individual person, and on the other extreme, the defense 
of individual rights puts a limit to communal sovereignty. 
Villoro’s political philosophy attempts to bring together 
these two currents, although I am not sure how successful 
he has been. In any case, one ought to emphasize that he 
has sought a synthesis in order to overcome these tensions.
FOURTH PORTRAIT: LA MEZQUITA AZUL
The blue mosque has six narrow minarets and a cascade of 
domes and semi-domes that make it look even taller than 
it is. Luis Villoro scans the interior, illuminated by dozens of 
blue glass windows and hundreds of small lamps that hang 
from the roof. Around him is a multitude of prostrated men 
who recite their prayers. Villoro admires the building like 
any other tourist; even so, a deep emotion overtakes him. 
Something bigger than him compels him to kneel down. He 
narrates the experience he had that moment:
I am aware that I am one of many, small, insignificant 
in the ocean of worshipping humanity (...). My voice 
gets lost among the voices of all the other men. 
It is the entirety of humanity that every so often 
crosses over to that other space of full otherness. 
But my vanity is still present. I am aware of myself 
and register my words. I realize I’m thinking about 
what I will do, maybe, write about this moment. So 
I pray: “Please remove my pride, let my immense 
pride be destroyed, have my egoism be erased 
once and for all. And only at that moment did I 
feel, only then I saw truthfully. Everything had 
forever turned transparent, everything was pure, 
(...) everything is well. The ‘I’ had been lost, small, 
trivial, forgotten. How amazing! Let this be, then! 
Let the all be all, let the all be one!4
But when the experience ended, when Villoro’s ‘I’ returned 
to take its place in the world, what Villoro feared when he 
dissolved in the chorus of prayers, took place. Villoro not 
only narrated his experience, but he also teased it apart with 
a brilliant ruthless analysis. The essay, titled “La Mezquita 
Azul,” was published in 1985. In this and other writings, 
Villoro has formulated to himself the questions of what the 
divine may be, how we may come to know it and speak 
about it, and what consequences one’s experience of the 
divine may have for our lives. Villoro does not believe in 
a personal God, but he does believe that mankind lives 
facing what is an absolute Other. Of this otherness, one 
cannot speak, but one may offer a meaningful silence. This 
philosophical place of Villoro’s is nourished by sources 
as diverse as the Upanishads, Buddha, Eckhart, Otto, 
and Wittgenstein. For Villoro, the encounter with radical 
otherness demonstrates to us that in the end, the ‘I’ is only 
an illusion and this is a good thing. But it seems to me that 
here is another tension in Villoro’s thought. On one hand, 
he complains about the ‘I’, of any ‘I’, his and that of others, 
but on the other hand, he believes that the vital encounter 
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is interested in providing and promoting philosophical 
defenses of immigrant rights.
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